

Zoran Gavrilović • Dražen Pavlica • Marina Mijatović

WORLD IN MEDIA



Bureau for Social Research

WORLD IN MEDIA

Belgrade, May 2019

Bureau for Social Research

CONTENT

Zoran Gavrilović
RESULTS OF MEDIA MONITORING

5

PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT MEDIA COVERAGE

65

Dražen Pavlica
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
GLOBAL TRIANGLE (USA, EU, RUSSIA) IN POLITICAL TALK SHOWS

72

Marina Mijatović
MONITORING OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF
ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OF MONITORING
SOFTWARE

85

Zoran Gavrilović

INTRODUCTION

Continuing its analysis of the content reported in primetime news of free-to-air television stations and TV N1, the Bureau for Social Research also monitored the news items where the USA, the EU and Russia were mentioned as actors.

The aim of this monitoring was to systematically research the reporting, and three key actors in international politics and their relations with Serbia.

Thus, in the period from 1 August to 31 December 2018, we carried out the monitoring of primetime news reports of RTS, TV Pink, TV Happy, TV Prva, TV 02 and TV N1.

In addition to analysing the reporting of media, we also analysed the positions of citizens concerning the manner in which the media reported on the three mentioned actors.

The research was conducted in two waves, from 22 to 25 April 2019 and from 2 to 5 May 2019 by telephone interviews on the representative sample of 1006 respondents, the citizens of the Republic of Serbia, excluding Kosovo territory.

The target population were the citizens of Serbia, aged 18 and older. The sampling frame was based on the data taken from the (electronic) Telephone Directory and official data from the 2011 Census.

The sample type was random, two-phase, stratified. Allocation was proportional to the size of the region, all municipalities, and types of settlements at the municipality level. Stratification was carried out based on: type of settlement – urban/rural and four geo-economic regions.

Automated control of data collection process was made by software and included interactive control of consistency and logic control of answers in 100% cases. One survey required the contacts with 6 potential respondents.

In addition to these two types of analyses, the publication will present the discourse analyses of political talk shows and the results of legal analysis of the activities of the Regulatory Authority of Electronic Media.

RESULTS OF MEDIA MONITORING

Research framework of primetime news (hereinafter: News) was comprised of 5089 news items broadcast from 1 August 2018 to 31 December 2018 by five free-to-air television stations and one cable channel N1.

The largest number of news items were telecast by Pink (992), which accounts for one fifth of the monitored news. In the same period, approximately similar number of news items were broadcast by a public broadcaster, RTS, where reporters prepared 940 news items.

TV Happy aired 929 news items and was the third television station according to the number of news items on the USA, Russia and the EU. TV O2 and N1 had the lowest number of monitored news items. TV O2 had 672 news items and N1 had 27 more, namely, 699 news items. (Table 1).

Somewhat different vantage point of the manner in which monitored TV stations reported their news could be obtained after seeing the information of the news length. Namely, the highest percent of the observed programme in the total length of 198 hours, or somewhat over one fourth of the total content, was broadcast by TV Pink (55:07:15). In its reporting on the EU, Russia and the USA, TV Happy took the second place (48:31:11), which accounted for somewhat less than ¼ of the observed time. Other television channels dedicated considerably less time to reporting on the three big countries the actions of which considerably influence the future of Serbia.

Table 1 Number of news items by television stations that were subject to monitoring

	N	%	time	%
RTS	940	18.5	30:25:55	15.4
TV Pink	992	19.5	55:07:15	27.8
TV Happy	929	18.3	48:31:11	24.5
Prva TV	857	16.8	24:56:51	12.6
O2	672	13.2	13:26:18	6.8
N1	699	13.7	25:32:26	12.9
Total	5089	100.0	197:59	100.0

We measured the number of news with announcement as an indicator of the attitude of the analysed television stations to the actors of our monitoring (USA, EU and Russia). Within the total number of 5089 news items, 1824 had an announcement.

According to our findings, on average, every third news item dealing with the USA, the EU and Russia was announced. RTS had the largest number of announced news items, and was followed by Pink and Happy, respectively (Table 2).

Table 2 Number and percent of announced news items by television stations

	N	%
RTS	367	20.1
TV Pink	354	19.4
TV Happy	318	17.4
Prva TV	286	15.7
O2	226	12.4
N1	273	15.0
Total	1824	100.0

Within the genre structure, non-dialogue forms were predominant: news, report, report with statement. They jointly accounted for somewhat more than a half of the news items. One third of news items were presented in the form of a topic i.e. media package. The number of analytical forms (analyses, commentaries, reportages) slightly exceeded 2%. (Table 3).

Table 3 Genre structure of news items

	N	%
News	1252	24.6
Report	475	9.3
Report with statement	1441	28.3
Studio guest, interview	209	4.1
Topic, media package	1593	31.3
Analysis	81	1.6
Commentary	17	.3
Reportage	21	.4
Total	5089	100.0

After making the comparison by television stations we could conclude that there were no significant deviations from the general findings, except in case of TV Happy where the reports with statements were the most represented genre, whereas the other TV channels preferred media package. TV Prva (6.2%) and N1 (3.7%) were the television stations where our monitoring identified the largest number of analytical news items (Table 4).

Table 4 Genre structure of news items by television stations

	RTS	Pink	Happy	Prva	O2	N1
News	22.1	27.7	20.6	28.2	33.6	15.7
Report	7.2	8.9	11.7	10.4	10.6	7.2
Report with statement	30.5	28.2	26.0	26.6	33.0	26.0
Studio guest, interview	1.3	2.8	16.3	1.3	0.1	0.9
Topic, media package	36.7	31.5	24.4	27.4	22.2	46.5
Analysis	1.0	0.2	0.4	5.0	0.3	3.0
Commentary	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.3
Reportage	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.4

After reviewing the results which indicated the type of events covered by the news, we could conclude that the news dealing with the actions of authorities were predominant (52.5%). Media initiatives and interviews and commentaries took second place (23%), and 14.6% of news items covered social events (Table 5).

Table 5 Structure of events in news items

	%
Current spontaneous event	4.4
Current event organised by government institutions	52.5
Event not organised by government institutions	14.6
Pseudo-event, generating media attention	5.6
Media initiatives, interviews, commentaries	23.0

Generally speaking, after analysing the results by television channels it could be seen that there were no significant differences. Spontaneous events were predominantly presented on O2 (6.3%), whereas the events organised by authorities (government events) were mostly presented on RTS (58.4%). The same television station also aired the largest number of news items covering the events that were not organized by government institutions (20.3%). The largest number of news items which were based on so-called pseudo-events i.e. the events with the purpose to generate media attention could be seen on TV O2 (8.6%). The television which broadcasted the largest number of news as a result of media initiative, interviews and commentaries was TV Prva (29.6%)

Table 6 Structure of events in news items by television stations

	RTS	Pink	Happy	Prva	O2	N1
Current spontaneous event	3.5	4.9	3.3	2.8	6.3	6.2
Current event organised by government institutions	58.4	50.1	53.9	45.9	51.9	54.5
Event not organised by government institutions	20.3	14.5	10.7	16.1	13.2	11.6
Pseudo-event, generating media attention	3.2	8.5	4.3	5.6	8.6	3.9
Media initiatives, interviews, commentaries	14.6	22.0	27.8	29.6	19.9	23.9

The conduct of reporters was the subject of our monitoring for the first time. Namely, in addition to the usual indicators which measure the attitude of media to the topics and actors, this time we wanted to measure the manner in which journalists were doing their job.

Table 7 Conduct of journalists in the media in relation to their news items on the USA, Russia and the EU.

	N	%		N	%
Conveys information OFF	3742	73.5	Inquiries, asks additional questions	157	3.1
Promotes the position of a participant	131	2.6	Calls to account	7	0.1
Propagandizes the position of a participant	13	.3	Reminds	16	0.3
Marches to the beat of his own drum - offends/labels	9	.2	Presents counterarguments /information	35	0.7
Advocates	12	.2	Criticizes – ideologically	1	0.0
Supports	52	1.0	Criticizes-personally	2	0.0
Educates	28	0.6	Criticizes - factually	8	0.2
Mocks	7	0.1	Entertains	8	0.2
Analyses	244	4.8	Compares USA/EU/RUS	6	0.1
Conveys information ON	609	12.0			

The above findings show that the largest number of news items, more than 80%, constitute the news where the journalists read the content. In 35 news items, the journalists presented counterarguments /information, whereas in 8 news items they resorted to factual criticism. After the analysis of television stations which were the subject of our monitoring, it could be seen that they did not differ, except for TV N1 where a considerable number of counterarguments and information were present.

The findings on the structure of sources confirmed a shallow manner of reporting on the USA, Russia and the EU. Namely, the monitoring findings showed that the key sources were those obtained from the newsroom with conveyance of communications. Two thirds of news items were sourced from newsroom, 13% used the communications of foreign government authorities, and 5% of news items were sourced from the communications of Serbian government authorities.

Conveyance of information taken from foreign media was very low, and such news were mostly taken from the USA, the EU and Russia.

Table 8 Sources in the news items on the USA, Russia and the EU.

Source	%
Newsroom	66.6
Communication – foreign participant	13.0
Communication – Serbian Government participant	5.5
Social networks	3.1
US electronic media	2.4
Foreign agencies	1.4
Correspondent	1.2
Russian electronic media	.8
Foreign electronic media that have no seat	.8
EU electronic media	.8
Regional electronic media	.8
Serbian print media	.6
Foreign print media	.6
Tanjug	.5
Regional press	.5
Serbian electronic media	.4
Internet portals	.3
Communication- Serbian non-governmental participant	.2
Beta	.2
FoNET	.1
Digital platforms	.1

Argumentation multiple answers	%
Facts	28.4
Position of high officials	27.7
Position of experts	7.8
Position of EU institution	6.9
Position of US institution	4.9
Position of Serbian institution	4.8
Position of citizens / stakeholder	4.4
Position of Russian institution	3.3
Position of journalist-analyst	2.4
Position of politicians	2.3
Position of third country institutions	1.8
Position of analysts	1.8
Position of public figure	1.0
US citizen	0.5
Strategy/policy	0.4
Contract	0.3
Research (scientific institution, university)	0.3
State statistics	0.2
Research - expert	0.2
Law	0.1
Research of international organisations	0.1
Russian citizen	0.1
EU citizen	0.0

Representation of the USA, Russia and the EU

The data provided in the Table 3 speak of the fact that the reporting of free-to-air television networks was, on the one hand, autocentric because it was largely concerned with Serbia, whereas, on the other hand, it was shallow, because mostly, the analysed actors were just mentioned, whether alone or in connection with Serbia.

Table 9 Number and length of news items by television stations

	Mention		Time	
	N	%	Sum	%
USA – independently presented	614	12.1	12:13:37	6.2
EU – independently presented	339	6.7	6:56:15	3.5
Russia– independently presented	263	5.2	5:01:28	2.5
USA, EU and Russia – equally represented	58	1.1	4:56:34	2.5
USA and the EU	80	1.6	4:11:55	2.1
USA and Russia	99	1.9	3:04:51	1.6
EU and Russia	30	.6	1:28:41	.7
USA and Serbia	205	4.0	6:26:12	3.3
EU and Serbia	336	6.6	13:50:58	7.0
Russia and Serbia	212	4.2	6:28:53	3.3
Serbia as dominant actor, and USA, Russia and the EU mentioned	1184	23.3	74:51:53	37.8
USA or EU or Russia-mentioned	1669	32.8	58:28:36	29.5
Total	5089	100.0	197:59	100.0

Among all the actors, the USA was also highly represented according to the number of times it was mentioned (12% of all news items) and the duration of news items (6.2% of the total length of all news items). This should also include the news items which reported on the relations with Serbia (205 news items that lasted 6:26:12) and mentioned the USA along with other actors.

According to the total length of time, the EU and its relations with Serbia took the second place (7% of the total time observed), in addition to 339 news items which lasted 6:56:15 and related to the reporting on the EU alone. A part of the EU representation also related to that time and those news items where the EU was mentioned together with Russia and the USA.

Russia took the third place by its representation. It was independently represented in 263 news items in the total duration of 5:01:28 and covered by 212 news items which dealt with relations between Serbia and Russia, the length of which was 6:28:53.

The public broadcaster also confirmed the hypothesis that the reporting on the EU, the USA, and Russia was mostly viewed through the lens of domestic affairs. During the five-month monitoring, the news items where Serbia was a predominant actor accounted for one third of the total analysed time (30:25:55), whereas the USA, Russia and the EU were just mentioned. In somewhat more than ¼ of news items the USA, the EU and Russia were just mentioned, whereas 10% of the analysed time was dedicated to relations between the EU and Serbia.

Table 10 Length of news items on RTS

	Time	%
Serbia as dominant actor, and mention of the USA, Russia and the EU	9:55:22	32.6
USA or EU or Russia-mentioned	8:38:50	28.4
EU and Serbia	3:14:11	10.6
EU – independently represented	1:34:02	5.1
USA – independently represented	1:39:44	5.5
Russia and Serbia	1:31:49	5.0
Russia– independently represented	1:09:46	3.8
USA and Serbia	1:08:48	3.8
USA and Russia	0:31:55	1.7
USA and the EU	0:31:50	1.7
USA, EU and Russia equally represented	0:18:34	1.0
EU and Russia	0:11:02	0.6

The biggest commercial television network, TV Pink, dedicated almost twice as much time to the reporting on the USA, Russia and the EU. Namely, during our monitoring it broadcasted news items in the total duration of 55:07:15.

The representation of actors was almost identical. However, TV Pink dedicated twice as much time to the news items where Serbia was a dominant actor whereas the USA, Russia and the EU were only mentioned (51.3%) which, again, showed the power-centricity of this television network. It is worth noting that as opposed to its presence on RTS, the EU was less independently represented than the USA, but more than Russia.

Table 11 Length of news items on TV Pink

	Time	%
Serbia as dominant actor, and mention of the USA, Russia and the EU	28:17:18	51.3
USA or EU or Russia-mentioned	12:45:54	23.2
EU and Serbia	3:16:08	5.9
USA – independently presented	2:10:30	3.9
Russia and Serbia	2:02:20	3.7
USA and the EU	1:25:10	2.6
USA and Serbia	1:13:44	2.2
EU –independently presented	1:04:19	1.9
USA, EU and Russia – equally represented	0:51:05	1.5
EU and Russia	0:43:22	1.3
Russia independently presented	0:40:51	1.2
USA and Russia	0:36:33	1.1

The model of reporting on the EU, Russia and the USA used by the two previously analysed free-to-air television channels was also used by TV Happy. TV Happy only differed in its time distribution where it balanced the time dedicated to the news items where Serbia appeared as dominant actor while the USA, Russia and the EU were only mentioned between the time such news items had on RTS and TV Pink.

Table 12 Length of news items on TV Happy

	Time	%
Serbia as dominant actor, and mention of the USA, Russia and the EU	18:15:03	37.6
USA or EU or Russia-mentioned	15:19:04	31.6
EU and Serbia	3:06:21	6.4
USA, EU and Russia – equally represented	2:51:42	5.9
USA independently presented	1:51:28	3.8
USA and Serbia	1:35:21	3.3
EU independently presented	1:28:57	3.1
Russia and Serbia	1:18:20	2.7
Russia independently presented	1:04:12	2.2
USA and the EU	1:00:53	2.1
USA and Russia	0:30:11	1.0
EU and Russia	0:09:38	.3

TV Prva was the first television station to deviate from the model of reporting on the topics which were the subject of our monitoring. The editors of this TV station dedicated most time (35%) to the news items where there was a mention of the USA or the EU or Russia. News items, where Serbia was a predominant actor and where the USA, Russia and the EU were only mentioned (28.8%), took the second place. According to their length of time, the news items, which independently presented the USA, came third.

Table 13 Length of news items on TV Prva

	Time	%
USA or EU or Russia-mentioned	8:50:03	35.4
Serbia as dominant actor, and mention of the USA, Russia and the EU	7:10:24	28.8
USA independently presented	2:00:28	8.0
EU and Serbia	1:38:17	6.6
USA and Serbia	1:05:45	4.4
EU independently presented	0:49:00	3.3
Russia independently presented	0:45:52	3.1
USA and Russia	0:44:28	3.0
USA and the EU	0:41:24	2.8
Russia and Serbia	0:34:52	2.3
USA, EU and Russia equally represented	0:27:31	1.8
EU and Russia	0:08:43	.6

TV O2 was the television station which dedicated the least time to the actors that were the subject of our monitoring - 13:26:18. Similarly to TV Prva, TV O2 also made particular adjustments to the well-established predominant model of reporting on the EU, Russia and the USA. Somewhat more than one third of time was dedicated to the USA or the EU or Russia as mentioned actors. News items where Serbia was a dominant actor while the USA, Russia and the EU were only mentioned accounted for one fourth of the time, whereas the news items, where out of the three analysed actors only the USA was mentioned, accounted for 11% of the time.

Table 14 Length of news items on TV O2

	Time	%
USA or EU or Russia-mentioned	5:02:19	37.5
Serbia as dominant actor, and mention of the USA, Russia and the EU	3:27:02	25.7
USA independently presented	1:28:47	11.0
EU independently presented	0:37:35	4.7
Russia independently presented	0:34:12	4.2
Russia and Serbia	0:34:11	4.2
USA and Serbia	0:29:33	3.7
EU and Serbia	0:25:29	3.2
USA and Russia	0:21:34	2.7
EU and Russia	0:12:36	1.6
USA, EU and Russia equally represented	0:07:18	.9
USA and the EU	0:05:40	.7

According to the data obtained through our monitoring, TV N1 dedicated equal time to the news items where the USA or the EU or Russia were only mentioned and to the news items where Serbia was the main actor along with the mention of the USA, Russia and the EU. Further order of actors fits into the described model.

Table 15 Length of news items on TV N1

	Time	%
USA or the EU or Russia- mentioned	7:52:24	30.8
Serbia dominant actor and USA, Russia and the EU mentioned	7:46:42	30.5
USA independently presented	3:02:41	11.9
EU and Serbia	2:10:31	8.5
EU independently presented	1:22:21	5.4
USA and Serbia	0:53:00	3.5
Russia independently presented	0:46:34	3.0
Russia and Serbia	0:27:21	1.8
USA and the EU	0:26:56	1.8
USA, EU and Russia equally represented	0:20:25	1.3
USA and Russia	0:20:10	1.3
EU and Russia	0:03:19	.2

Analysis of arguments

Between our findings on representation and tone of reporting, we will present our findings on the line of arguments. The most used arguments in the analysed news items were facts (28.4%). Those were mostly the pieces of information which spoke of the activities of participants (meetings). The views of public officials, who expressed their opinions about other actors or events, took the second place.

This dimension of our research also speaks of the nature of reporting in primetime news. Namely, this finding showed the shallowness of reporting. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the views expressed by experts, references to researches, and position of citizens were lacking.

Table 16 Arguments in analysed news items on the USA, Russia and the EU

Arguments multiple answers	%
Facts	28.4
Position of high officials	27.7
Position of experts	7.8
Position of EU institutions	6.9
Position of USA institutions	4.9
Position of Serbian institutions	4.8
Position of citizens / stakeholders	4.4
Position of Russian institutions	3.3
Position of journalists –analysts	2.4
Position of politicians	2.3
Position of third country institutions	1.8
Position of analysts	1.8
Position of public figures	1.0
US citizens	0.5
Strategy/politics	0.4
Contracts	0.3
Researches (scientific institutions, university)	0.3
State statistics	0.2
Researches – experts	0.2
Law	0.1
Researches of international organisations	0.1
Russian citizens	0.1
EU citizens	0.0

Table 17 Arguments in analysed news items on the USA, Russia and the EU by television stations

	RTS	Pink	Happy	Prva	O2	N1
Position of citizens / stakeholders	7.9	5.5	3.3	9.3	6.7	10.4
Position of high officials	46.8	42.7	44.9	42.1	43.8	47.6
Position of experts	11.5	13.5	16.4	11.2	7.0	14.3
Position of politicians	2.7	4.0	3.3	3.9	2.1	6.7
State statistics	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3
Researches – experts	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.9
Researches (scientific institutions, university)	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.9
Researches of international organisations	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1
Law	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.4
Strategy/politics	0.6	0.2	0.8	0.7	.9	0.4
Agreements	0.5	0.3	1.4	0.2	0.4	0.1
Position of analysts	1.5	4.5	3.4	2.1	0.7	4.3
Position of journalists-analysts	0.9	6.3	2.0	5.8	2.2	6.0
Russian citizen	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0
US citizen	0.9	0.4	0.2	0.7	1.2	1.9
EU citizen	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Facts	47.4	47.4	36.4	50.8	48.5	45.2
Position of public figures	2.1	1.3	1.4	1.5	2.2	0.9
Position of Serbian institutions	11.8	6.9	9.6	4.7	3.1	9.0
Position of US institutions	8.3	6.7	4.4	7.9	8.9	12.6
Position of EU institutions	13.4	8.3	11.2	10.5	8.8	14.7
Position of Russian institutions	8.0	5.0	4.7	4.6	5.7	3.7
Position of third country institutions	4.8	2.3	2.6	1.2	2.5	3.9
Position of the church	0.6	0.9	1.1	0.1	0.4	0.0

Observing the findings by television stations and their primetime news that were subject to our monitoring, we can conclude that the arguments used by RTS were closer to state television stations than to the public service because RTS used the facts relating to the actions i.e. positions of public officials and bodies.

TV N1, that was more open to citizens, politicians and analysts, Pink TV, and the positions of US institutions found themselves at the other end.

Tone of reporting

In the previous section, after presenting the data on the scope of reporting on Russia, the USA and the EU, we found that within the three analysed actors, the USA had the highest representation. That is but one of the indicators measured during our monitoring. The other indicator, maybe even more important one, was the tone of presentation when the actors were concerned.

The Table 10 clearly shows two tendencies. First is to predominantly report in a neutral tone and the second is to report on Russia positively. Namely, 1/5 of news items presented Russia positively, and accounted for twice the presentation of the EU and somewhat less than three times the presentation of the USA.

In addition, the USA, as the most represented actor, was also the most negatively presented actor (9.4% of news items), whereas Russia was the least negatively presented actor (2.7% of news items).

Table 18 Tone of reporting on Russia, the USA and the EU

Actor	Tone	%
EU	Neutral	83.3
	Positive	10.4
	Negative	6.3
USA	Neutral	82.7
	Positive	7.9
	Negative	9.4
Russia	Neutral	76.5
	Positive	20.8
	Negative	2.7

When observed by actors and television stations, the EU was most positively presented on RTS and TV Happy, and most negatively on TV Pink and TV Prva. The USA was the topic of most positive news items aired by TV Happy, and of most negative news items on TV Pink and TV Prva.

Finally, Russia was most positively presented on TV Pink and TV Happy, and negatively on N1 where, at the same time, it was more positively presented than the USA and the EU.

Table 19 Tone of reporting on Russia, the USA and the EU by television stations

		RTS	Pink	Happy	Prva	O2	N1
tone of EU	Neutral	81.6	80.0	80.5	84.5	85.2	90.8
	Positive	14.9	10.2	13.5	8.4	8.2	4.2
	Negative	3.5	9.7	6.0	7.1	6.6	5.0
tone of USA	Neutral	84.0	78.6	76.7	87.4	83.4	86.8
	Positive	8.8	7.9	12.7	4.8	6.5	7.1
	Negative	7.1	13.5	10.6	7.8	10.1	6.2
tone of RUSSIA	Neutral	79.5	73.2	72.6	76.7	77.1	83.2
	Positive	19.6	25.8	25.3	18.8	18.2	11.0
	Negative	.9	1.0	2.1	4.5	4.7	5.8

Analysis of actors

In this part of the text we will present the actors and their representation. As the unit of measure we used their mention in news items, where one news item was considered as one mention.

Table 20 The most represented actors

Actor	Number of news items in which an actor appeared
Aleksandar Vučić	981
Donald Trump	521
Vladimir Putin	376
US institution representative	369
Ana Brnabić	275
Ivica Dačić	274
Federica Mogherini	206
Johannes Hahn	188
EU institution representative	163
Russian institution representative	160
European officials	159
Angela Merkel	138
European Commission	113
Kyle Scott	109
Maja Kocijančič- European Commission Spokeswoman	105
Sergey Lavrov	60
Jadranka Joksimović	49
State Department	27
David McAllister	24
White House	21
Dmitry Medvedev	7
Austrian presidency of the EU Council	6
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers	3
Tanja Mišćević	2

The content of the Table 21 raises a question as to whether Serbia is the country heading toward the European Union. The presence of EU actors and those dealing with EU process in the primetime news spoke of the fact that in the area of European integration little work had been done, if any. Namely, the editors of free-to-air television channels did not find those activities interesting.

As most monitorings carried out after 2014, this one also showed that the Serbian media are Vučić-centric and that even in this case he was the most represented actor. President Vučić was followed by US and Russian actors and Serbian government representatives, and all of them left behind the EU actors. The marginalization of the European Agenda in Serbia was also reflected in the number of news items dedicated to the lady Minister of European Integration (49) and Head of the Negotiating Team, Tanja Mišćević (only 2).

Another striking trend was a considerable presence of the US and Russian political leaders relative to the so-called institutional and social actors. The representation of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin supported this thesis.

Now, we will analyse our monitoring findings which concern the extent of actors' presence on television stations. However, presented will be only those actors whose representation exceeded 1%.

The Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić, had the most prominent presence in the analysed news items aired by RTS. Such presence also had high officials, in general, such as the US President, Donald Trump, Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, and the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. EU officials took the seventh place among the EU representatives and were mentioned only in general terms.

Table 21 The most represented actors - RTS

Actor	Percent of representation of news items in which an actor appeared
Aleksandar Vučić	7.3
Foreign officials	4.2
Donald Trump	3.9
Ana Brnabić	3.1
Vladimir Putin	3.0
US institution representative	2.6
Ivica Dačić	2.4
Serbian state officials	2.4
European officials	1.9
Serbian institution representative	1.7
EU institution representative	1.7
Russian institution representative	1.7
Federica Mogherini	1.4
Angela Merkel	1.3
Johannes Hahn	1.1
Alexander Chepurin	1.0
Aleksandar Vulin	1.0
Public figures	1.0

The trend showing a predominant presence of the President Aleksandar Vučić was even more pronounced on TV Pink. The number of news items where the US President, Donald Trump, was present was two times lower, whereas the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, was covered in considerably smaller number of news items. Johannes Hahn was the most represented EU actor.

Table 22 The most represented actors - Pink

Actor	Percent of representation of news items in which an actor appeared
Aleksandar Vučić	11.0
Donald Trump	4.9
Vladimir Putin	3.4
Analyst	2.4
US institution representative	2.4
Foreign officials	1.9
Serbian state officials	1.8
Johannes Hahn	1.7
Serbian institution representative	1.5
Ana Brnabić	1.5
Federica Mogherini	1.3
Marko Đurić	1.3
Ivica Dačić	1.2
EU institution representative	1.2
Russian institution representative	1.2
Serbian List	1.1
European officials	1.0

The President of Serbia and the President of the Serbian Progressive Party, Aleksandar Vučić, was the most represented actor on TV Happy, as well. Serbian state officials, Donald Trump, the presidents of Serbian institutions, and Vladimir Putin did not lag much behind in their presence and took the second place.

As in the case of two previously mentioned television stations, the EU representatives, EU institution representatives, Federica Mogherini, and Johannes Hahn found their place at the second part of the representation table.

Table 23 The most represented actors on TV Happy

Actor	Percent of representation of news items in which an actor appeared
Aleksandar Vučić	6.0
Serbian state officials	4.5
Donald Trump	3.7
Serbian institution representative	2.8
Vladimir Putin	2.6
US institution representative	2.6
Ivica Dačić	2.6
Ana Brnabić	2.3
Foreign officials	2.1
EU institution representative	1.8
Federica Mogherini	1.7
Johannes Hahn	1.5
Russian institution representative	1.5
NATO	1.4
European officials	1.4
Analyst	1.4
European Commission	1.1
Local self-governments	1.1

When it came to TV Prva, for the first time the EU representatives (Federica Mogherini in particular) had a somewhat higher representation, along with proverbial representation of the Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić and the US and Russian President. It is worth noting that the US Ambassador to Serbia had a considerable presence on TV Prva.

Table 24 The most represented actors on TV Prva

Actor	Percent of representation of news items in which an actor appeared
Aleksandar Vučić	7.3
Donald Trump	3.6
Vladimir Putin	3.3
US institution representative	2.8
Ivica Dačić	2.3
Federica Mogherini	1.7
Analyst	1.7
Johannes Hahn	1.5
Kyle Scott	1.3
Foreign officials	1.3
Ana Brnabić	1.3
NATO	1.2
Angela Merkel	1.2
Maja Kocijančič- European Commission Spokeswoman	1.1
Marko Đurić	1.0
Serbian List	1.0
EU institution representative	1.0

The representation of actors on TV O2 was almost identical to that on the above-analysed TV stations. Namely, the Presidents Vučić, Trump and Putin were the most represented actors. However, Federica Mogherini and Johannes Hahn also found themselves at the top of the table as the representatives of the EU and US institutions.

Table 25 The most represented actors - TV O2

Actor	Percent of representation of news items in which an actor appeared
Aleksandar Vučić	8.1
Donald Trump	4.2
Vladimir Putin	3.8
US institution representative	3.6
Foreign officials	2.7
Ivica Dačić	2.5
Federica Mogherini	1.9
Johannes Hahn	1.8
Ana Brnabić	1.7
Russian institution representative	1.5
Angela Merkel	1.1
Maja Kocijančič- European Commission Spokeswoman	1.0
Public figures	1.0
NATO	1.0
Kyle Scott	1.0
Alexander Chepurin	1.0

On TV N1 there were no significant deviations from the distribution shown by all monitored television stations, except in the case of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, who was considerably less present. Aleksandar Vučić was the most represented actor on this television station, Donald Trump had the second and US institution representatives the third place. EU institution representatives were in the middle of the table.

Table 26 The most represented actors - TV N1

Actor	Percent of representation of news items in which an actor appeared
Aleksandar Vučić	6.2
Donald Trump	4.2
US institution representative	3.9
Ana Brnabić	3.0
Foreign officials	2.5
Ivica Dačić	2.1
Federica Mogherini	2.0
European officials	1.9
Vladimir Putin	1.7
Analyst	1.5
European Parliament	1.4
Angela Merkel	1.3
Johannes Hahn	1.3
European Commission	1.3
Serbian institution representative	1.2
NATO	1.1
EU institution representative	1.0

Thematic analysis of news items

The analysis of the findings in relation to the news items on the USA, Russia and the EU speaks of a particular “Kosovoisation” of reporting on foreign policy and relations between Serbia and these three centres of world power. The Brussels Agreement, Kosovo internal politics, Kosovo beyond Brussels – life in Kosovo, generally resolving Kosovo issue, and visits to Kosovo comprised the Kosovo collage and eclipsed the relations between Serbia and the mentioned actors and the presentation of social, political and economic life in Russia, the USA and the EU. Topics largely related to the USA, Russia and the EU. Political or institutional themes prevailed over social life.

Table 27 The most represented topics

Topic	Percent of topic representation
Brussels Agreement	9.0
Kosovo internal politics	8.6
Sport	7.7
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	3.7
Regional relations	3.7
US foreign policy	3.6
Worldwide current events	3.5
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	3.2
US social life	2.8
Russian foreign policy	2.7
Tentative solution for Kosovo	2.6
Serbian internal politics	2.5
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	2.4
US internal politics	2.1
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	1.9
EU internal politics	1.9
Session of the UN General Assembly	1.9
Serbia's EU integration	1.9
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.7
Celebrations and commemorations	1.3
Official relations between Serbia and the EU	1.3
Official relations between Serbia and the USA	1.3
EU's foreign policy	1.2
Visits to Kosovo	1.0

In the analysed news items on the USA, Russia and the EU, sport was the most represented topic. Kosovo collage took the second place and was followed by Serbia's foreign policy and topics relating to the USA, Russia, and the EU.

Table 28 The most represented topics - RTS

Topic	Percent of topic representation
Sport	11.7
Brussels Agreement	5.3
Kosovo internal politics	5.2
Worldwide current events	4.4
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	4.0
US foreign policy	3.9
Serbian internal politics	3.5
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	3.3
Russian foreign policy	3.2
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	3.0
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	2.9
EU internal politics	2.4
Serbia's EU integration	2.3
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	2.1
Tentative solution for Kosovo	1.9
US internal politics	1.9
Regional relations	1.8
Official relations between Serbia and the EU	1.8
Economy, businessmen	1.8
US social life	1.6
Official relations between Serbia and the USA	1.4
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and USA	1.4
Culture	1.3
Celebrations and commemorations	1.2
Internal politics of Russia	1.2
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.2
Session of the UN General Assembly	1.1
Education/science	1.1
Security	1.1
Church	1.0
Human and minority rights	1.0
Brexit	1.0

Unlike on RTS, the presentation of the topic of Kosovo internal politics (within Kosovo collage) on TV Pink was such that it came first, whereas sport came as a second topic. Other topics followed the pattern USA – Russia – EU, where two themes were present: one covered regional relations while the other related to the worldwide current events.

Table 29 The most represented topics - Pink

Topic	Percent of topic representation
Kosovo internal politics	8.9
Sport	8.0
Brussels Agreement	7.9
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	5.9
US foreign policy	4.5
Regional relations	3.2
Worldwide current events	3.2
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	3.0
US social life	2.7
Russian foreign policy	2.7
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	2.3
Tentative solution for Kosovo	2.2
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	2.2
US internal politics	2.2
EU internal politics	2.1
Serbian internal politics	2.0
Session of the UN General Assembly	1.9
Official relations between Serbia and the USA	1.6
EU's foreign policy	1.6
Celebrations and commemorations	1.5
Visits to Kosovo	1.4
Opposition	1.4
Official relations between Serbia and the EU	1.3
Natural catastrophes	1.3
Serbia's EU integration	1.2
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.2
Medical services - healthcare	1.2
Church	1.2
Economy, businessmen	1.0

On TV Happy, topics within Kosovo collage took the first two places, whereas regional relations found themselves in the third place. They were followed by the topics concerning the USA, Serbian internal politics, and cooperation of Serbia with the EU and Russia.

Table 30 The most represented topics- Happy

Topic	Percent of topic representation
Kosovo internal politics	8.2
Brussels Agreement	8.1
Regional relations	5.8
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	4.0
Worldwide current events	4.0
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	3.3
US foreign policy	3.2
Serbian internal politics	3.1
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	3.1
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	3.0
Russian foreign policy	2.7
Tentative solution for Kosovo	2.6
EU internal politics	2.3
Serbia's EU integration	2.3
Sport	2.2
Session of the UN General Assembly	1.9
Serbian economy	1.8
Celebrations and commemorations	1.7
Education/science	1.5
US internal politics	1.4
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	1.4
EU's foreign policy	1.4
Human and minority rights	1.3
Weaponry	1.2
Environment	1.2
US social life	1.1
Culture	1.1
Economy, businessmen	1.0
Church	1.0
EU integration of the Western Balkans	1.0
Serbian-EU legislation alignment	1.0
Climate changes	1.0

In the analysed news items of TV prva, sport was a leading topic. The topics of Kosovo collage and the topics concerning Serbian foreign policy followed, along with the foreign policy of the USA and worldwide current events. The topic of EU integration and relations with Serbia is in the other part of the Table, as in the case of all other monitored TV stations.

Table 31 The most represented topics-Prva

Topic	Percent of topic representation
Sport	13.0
Brussels Agreement	11.6
Kosovo internal politics	11.6
Regional relations	4.0
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	3.7
Tentative solution for Kosovo	3.4
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	2.8
US foreign policy	2.7
Worldwide current events	2.5
US social life	2.2
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	2.1
Russian foreign policy	2.0
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	2.0
US internal politics	1.9
Serbia - Kosovo demarcation	1.9
Session of the UN General Assembly	1.8
Serbia's EU integration	1.8
EU internal politics	1.5
Official relations between Serbia and the USA	1.5
Serbian internal politics	1.3
EU's foreign policy	1.1
Visits to Kosovo	1.1

In comparison to TV Prva, particular topics on TV O2 switched places. Topics from Kosovo collage (Brussels Agreement, Kosovo internal politics) took the first place and were followed by sport. TV Prva was also considerably interested in the topic of US foreign policy and Russian foreign policy, whereas the topics concerning EU integration were marginalized.

Table 32 The most represented topics- O2

Topic	Percent of topic representation
Brussels Agreement	11.9
Kosovo internal politics	11.9
Sport	9.2
US social life	5.1
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	4.0
US foreign policy	3.4
Russian foreign policy	3.3
Regional relations	3.1
Tentative solution for Kosovo	3.0
Session of the UN General Assembly	3.0
Worldwide current events	2.7
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	2.2
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	2.1
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	2.1
Official relations between Serbia and the USA	1.6
Social life - Russia	1.6
US internal politics	1.5
Serbia's EU integration	1.3
EU's foreign policy	1.3
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and USA	1.3
Accidents	1.3
Visits to Kosovo	1.2
EU internal politics	1.0
Natural catastrophes	1.0

Selected as a control subject of monitoring, N1, unlike other analysed TV stations, did not put sport among the leading topics of its news items. In the news items of this TV station, the topics of Kosovo were also the most represented ones, particularly those where the USA, the EU and Russia were mentioned. Other topics had the same representation as given by the other television stations.

Table 33 The most represented topics– N1

Topic	Percent of topic representation
Brussels Agreement	11.2
Kosovo internal politics	6.3
US social life	5.3
Serbian internal politics	4.7
Worldwide current events	4.1
US internal politics	4.1
Regional relations	4.0
US foreign policy	3.7
Tentative solution for Kosovo	2.7
Russian foreign policy	2.6
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	2.3
Serbia's EU integration	2.3
Official relations between Serbia and the EU	2.1
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	1.9
Session of the UN General Assembly	1.9
Celebrations and commemorations	1.9
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	1.7
EU internal politics	1.7
Media and media freedoms	1.7
Sport	1.6
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.4
Accidents	1.4
Serbia-Kosovo demarcation	1.3
Opposition	1.3
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.1
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	1.0
Visits to Kosovo	1.0
Social and economic cooperation between RS and the USA	1.0
Natural catastrophes	1.0
Serbian economy	1.0
Judicial system	1.0
Brexit	1.0

Inspired by low representation of the topics relating to the EU integration, at the end of the theme section we presented the findings relating to the number of news items by Negotiating Chapters. In our monitoring we found that on 6 analysed TV stations, the total number of news items was 141 or somewhat less than one per day!?

The largest number of news items related to Chapters: 18 – Statistics (23), 17 – Economic and Monetary Policy (22), 23 Judiciary and Fundamental Rights (21). 31 Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (17) and 24 Justice, Freedom and Security (15).

Table 34 Number of news items by Negotiating Chapters

Chapter	Chapter number
Right of establishment and freedom to provide services	1
Public procurement	2
Company law	2
Intellectual property right	3
Competition policy	2
Financial services	4
Agriculture and rural development	1
Transport policy	1
Energy	1
Economic and monetary policy	22
Statistics	23
Enterprise and industrial policy	3
Trans-European networks	1
Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments	1
Judiciary and fundamental rights	21
Justice, freedom and security	15
Education and culture	3
Environment and climate changes	8
External relations	1
Foreign, security and defence policy	17
Other issues - Kosovo	9

Daily newspapers

In addition to five-month monitoring of free-to-air television networks and cable TV N1, the following daily newspapers were also the subject of our monitoring from 1 to 31 January 2019: Politika, Danas, Večernje novosti, Blic, Kurir, Informer, Srpski telegraf and Alo.

Table 35 Statistics of news items in daily newspapers covering the topic of the USA, the EU and Russia from 1 to 31 January 2019.

	News items	%	cm2	%	Arithmetic mean cm2	Page size cm2	Number of pages
Politika	752	19.3	239848	21.9	319	1222.6	196
Danas	552	14.2	139060	12.7	252	856.08	162
Večernje novosti	595	15.3	184252	16.8	310	887.5	208
Blic	482	12.4	110622	10.1	230	732.8	151
Kurir	404	10.4	124160	11.3	307	739.2	168
Informer	337	8.7	77320	7.0	229	627	123
Srpski telegraf	398	10.2	117081	10.7	294	731.4	160
Alo	368	9.5	105310	9.6	286	744.2	142
Total	3888	100.0	1097653	100.0	282		1310

The results presented in the Table 35 show that the newspapers that can be classified into those that have a political slant (Politika, Večernje novosti and Danas) had the largest number of articles that were subject to our monitoring.

The monitored articles of Politika, Blic and Večernje novosti had the highest percent of front page headlines.

Table 36 Percent of headlines on front pages, per daily newspaper

Daily newspaper	Percent of articles with front page headlines
Politika	10.0
Danas	6.5
Večernje novosti	8.2
Blic	8.7
Kurir	7.4
Informer	7.4
Srpski telegraf	7.8
Alo	7.6

The division line made at the beginning now carries even more weight. There is a higher percent of daily newspapers with political slant (Danas, Politika, Večernje

novine and Blic) which had informative or info-critical or critical headlines, as opposed to tabloids (Kurir, Informer, Srpski telegraf and Alo) which had the largest number of sensationalist headlines.

Table 37 Discourse of headlines by daily newspapers

	Informative	Info-critical	Critical	Sensationalist
Politika	88.3	0.4	6.8	3.6
Danas	67.9	3.4	17.4	4.2
Večernje novosti	79.8	0.5	4.5	12.4
Blic	74.1	0.2	9.8	10.6
Kurir	56.2	0.0	7.7	27.0
Informer	58.5	0.6	6.8	23.4
Srpski telegraf	51.3	0.3	7.0	33.4
Alo	56.8	0.0	11.4	26.1
Total	69.7	0.7	8.9	15.2

The presence of panic and fear, as an indicator measured in our monitoring, additionally confirmed the division of media into those with political slant and tabloids. Namely, tabloid media largely instilled panic and fear. This was notably true for Srpski telegraf and Alo.

Table 38 Presence of panic /fear

	Number of articles
Politika	8
Danas	5
Večernje novosti	8
Blic	8
Kurir	19
Informer	17
Srpski telegraf	34
Alo	22
Total	121

The articles where Serbia was a predominant actor, and where the USA, Russia and the EU were just mentioned accounted for somewhat more than a half of analysed articles. The articles where the USA was independently presented and relations between Russia and Serbia took the second and third place. The fourth place belonged to the articles on cooperation between Serbia and the USA. The EU as an actor, and its cooperation with Serbia, was somewhat less represented.

The analysis of genre structure indicated a relatively shallow reporting because out of the total number of analysed news items, more than a half belonged to the non-dialogue genre forms (news, report, report with statement)

Table 39 Genre structure

Genre	%
News	17.2
Report	16.0
Report with statement	30.9
Interview	3.0
Topic-media package	19.4
Analysis	2.0
Commentary/newspaper column	6.3
Reportage	2.6
Editorial	0.2
Cartoon	2.4

Segmentation of analysis by newspapers speaks of the fact that the percent of non-analytical i.e. non-dialogue genres was the highest in tabloid newspapers and the lowest in Danas and Politika daily. However, it is important to note that the media package was considerably present in tabloids (Kurir and Srpski telegraf),

Table 39.1 Genre structure by daily newspapers

	Politika	Danas	Večernje novosti	Blic	Kurir	Informer	Srpski telegraf	Alo
News	9.2	10.0	23.7	20.5	19.3	21.1	20.6	19.6
Report	19.2	15.4	18.8	14.5	12.9	9.8	15.3	17.9
Report with statement	24.8	26.4	25.5	33.6	39.1	42.1	33.7	33.2
Interview	1.9	3.8	3.0	3.9	2.5	.9	3.0	4.9
Topic-media package	26.2	17.6	17.0	14.5	20.3	20.5	22.4	13.3
Analysis	3.3	3.8	1.0	2.3	0.7	0.0	0.8	1.9
Commentary/newspaper column	12.0	15.6	3.2	5.4	1.2	0.6	0.3	4.6
Reportage	3.1	1.8	4.4	2.7	2.2	0.0	2.5	3.0
Editorial	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	.5
Cartoon	0.4	5.3	3.0	2.1	1.7	4.7	1.5	1.1

Analysing the nature of events that were placed in the focus of the analysed articles, we can conclude that the most present events were those organized by authorities, and such events were followed by media initiatives and commentaries.

Table 40 Structure of events

Event	%
Current spontaneous event (earthquake, fire)	3.4
Current event organised by government institutions	38.6
Event organised beyond government institutions	20.3
Pseudo-event - generating media attention	4.8
Media initiatives, interviews and commentaries	32.9

The above results show two findings. Firstly, pseudo-events were considerably present in tabloids, notably Informer. On the other hand, Danas daily contained most media initiatives and commentaries.

Table 41 Structure of events by TV stations

	Politika	Danas	Večernje novosti	Blic	Kurir	Informer	Srpski telegraf	Alo
Current spontaneous event (earthquake, fire)	2.8	1.1	3.9	4.4	4.7	3.6	4.0	4.1
Current event organised by government institutions	46.5	32.6	39.5	39.0	38.4	36.2	39.2	31.0
Event organised beyond government institutions	17.3	21.6	20.0	17.0	22.0	21.7	21.1	25.3
Pseudo-event - generating media attention	0.9	1.1	3.0	5.8	5.2	12.5	9.8	7.3
Media initiatives, interviews and commentaries	32.5	43.7	33.6	33.8	29.7	26.1	25.9	32.3

Half of the analysed news items related to those where Serbia - with the USA, Russia and the EU - was a predominant actor, and where in every tenth news item the USA was independently presented. Similar number of articles included Serbia and Russia as actors and their cooperation. The presence of the EU followed, particularly the cooperation with Serbia, including the EU integration.

Table 42 Representation of the USA, Russia and the EU

	N	%	average cm ²	cm ²	%
USA – independently presented	417	10.7	162	67734	6.2
EU - independently presented	137	3.5	198	27069	2.5
Russia– independently presented	117	3.0	157	18402	1.7
USA, EU and Russia – equally represented	54	1.4	475	25657	2.3
USA and EU	51	1.3	405	20633	1.9
USA and Russia	113	2.9	340	38368	3.5
EU and Russia	43	1.1	346	14861	1.4
SAD and Serbia	311	8.0	243	75635	6.9
EU and Serbia	132	3.4	226	29887	2.7
Russia and Serbia	350	9.0	279	97734	8.9
Serbia as dominant actor, and USA, Russia and EU mentioned	2125	54.7	311	661590	60.3
USA or EU or Russia-mentioned	38	1.0	543	20083	1.8

Our comparison by daily newspapers produced quite interesting findings. This notably related to the fact that the USA and Russia were mostly present in tabloid dailies (Kurir, Informer and Srpski telegraf) and Novosti, whereas the relations between the USA and Serbia were mostly covered by Blic, Alo and Novosti.

Table 43 Representation of the USA, Russia and the EU by daily newspapers

	Politika	Danas	Novosti	Blic	Kurir	Informer	Srpski telegraf	Alo
SAD - independently presented	7.6	6.3	12.4	11.2	16.6	15.4	12.3	7.9
EU - independently presented	3.1	4.2	2.2	5.2	4.0	3.6	4.0	2.4
Russia- independently presented	2.1	1.3	3.2	3.5	4.2	3.6	4.8	2.7
USA, EU and Russia – equally represented	1.9	2.4	1.5	0.8	1.0	1.2	0.5	1.1
USA and EU	2.1	1.3	1.5	0.8	0.7	1.5	1.3	0.5
USA and Russia	3.7	1.6	3.0	1.7	2.5	2.1	6.0	2.4
EU and Russia	0.9	1.4	0.7	1.0	1.5	1.8	1.0	0.8
SAD and Serbia	6.6	5.4	9.4	10.6	6.7	6.8	8.5	10.9
EU and Serbia	3.1	5.3	3.2	3.3	3.7	3.3	2.8	2.2
Russia and Serbia	5.2	9.8	9.4	6.6	8.7	11.6	10.3	14.7
Serbia as dominant actor, and USA, Russia and EU mentioned	62.1	59.8	52.3	54.4	49.8	48.7	48.5	53.5
USA or EU or Russia- mentioned	1.6	1.3	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.8

Within the total number of analysed articles, two thirds of news items were sourced from newsrooms, whereas 14.1% articles used foreign actors as their source. Other source types, including domestic and foreign sources, had a low presence. The fact that only 0.7% of articles were produced by the correspondents was a disturbing finding.

Table 44 Media sources

Media sources	%
Newsroom	74.9
Communication – foreign participant	14.1
Communication – Serbian government participant	3.9
Tanjug	3.7
US electronic media	3.5
Social networks	3.2
Russian electronic media	2.3
Foreign agencies	2.3
Communication – Serbian non-governmental participant	1.8
Beta	1.4
Serbian electronic media	1.4
EU electronic media	1.3
Regional electronic media	0.9
Correspondent	0.7
FoNET	0.4
Serbian print media	0.4
Internet portals	0.2
Foreign print media	0.1
Foreign electronic media that have no seat	0.1

Nine out of ten news items passed over the information, which additionally confirmed our finding that the approach to reporting on the USA, the EU and Russia was shallow.

Table 45 Media conduct of journalists.

Conduct	%
Conveys information	91.9
Inquiries, asks additional questions	1.7
Supports	1.3
Promotes the position of a participant	0.9
Analyses	0.6
Marches to the beat of his own drum - offends/labels	0.6
Educates	0.5
Entertains	0.4
Reminds	0.4
Propagandizes the position of a participant	0.3
Criticizes-factually	0.3
Mocks	0.3
Criticizes-personally	0.3
Criticizes-ideologically	0.1
Advocates	0.1
Presents counterarguments /information	0.1
Banalizes	0.1

It is interesting to note that the majority of offensive conduct and labelling could be found in Srpski telegraf (8), Alo and Informer (6 each), Kurir (5), and Večernje novosti (1).

Accordingly, the fact that the EU (86.8%), the USA (88.5%) and Russia (72.9%) were mostly neutrally presented made sense. On the other hand, Russia was two and a half times and four and a half times more positively presented than the EU and the USA, respectively.

Table 46 Tone of presenting the USA, Russia and the EU

Tone of presenting the EU in a news item	Neutrally	86.8
	Positively	8.6
	Negatively	4.6
Tone of presenting the USA in a news item	Neutrally	88.5
	Positively	5.3
	Negatively	6.2
Tone of presenting Russia in a news item	Neutrally	72.9
	Positively	24.3
	Negatively	2.8

Analysis of actors

The representation of actors was the subject of our analysis. In the period when monitoring of daily newspapers was conducted Serbia was visited by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and thus, he was the most represented actor. His host, Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić, took the second place and the US President, Donald Trump, came third.

As in the case of television stations, in daily press, European actors in the capacity of European officials found themselves in the lower part of the table.

Table 47 The most represented actors

Actor	Percent of news items on actors
Vladimir Putin	6.3
Aleksandar Vučić	4.4
Donald Trump	4.3
Experts	3.9
Public figures	3.1
Foreign officials	2.6
Citizens	2.5
US institution representative	2.3
Athletes	1.9
Serbian state officials	1.7
European officials	1.4
Analyst	1.3
Regional state officials	1.3
Ivica Dačić	1.2
Ramush Haradinaj	1.2
American politician	1.1
Russian institution representative	1.1
Journalist as analyst	1.1
Hashim Thaci	1.0

In our 30-day monitoring, the most present actor in Politika daily was the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić and his guest, Vladimir Putin, as well as the US President, Donald Trump. The only EU actor that was covered by Politika journalists was the European Commission.

Table 48 The most represented actors – Politika

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Aleksandar Vučić	4.0
Vladimir Putin	5.4
Donald Trump	5.3
Experts	5.2
Serbian state officials	2.3
US institution representative	2.3
Foreign officials	2.3
Regional state officials	2.3
Citizens	2.2
Journalist as analyst	1.4
Russian institution representative	1.3
American politician	1.3
Ramush Haradinaj	1.2
Ivica Dačić	1.2
Corporations	1.2
NATO	1.1
Angela Merkel	1.1
Public figures	1.1
European Commission	1.1
Ana Brnabić	1.0

Danas daily belongs to the group of media that, in their reporting, gave more space to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin than to the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić. The table of actors clearly shows that the monitored news items featured analysts, civil society representatives, and investigative journalists. The presence of EU officials in Danas daily also put them at the lower half of the table that shows the representation of actors.

Table 49 The most represented actors – Danas daily

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Vladimir Putin	8.0
Aleksandar Vučić	5.7
Experts	4.7
Donald Trump	4.3
Journalist as analyst	2.7
Foreign officials	2.4
Analyst	2.1
OCD	2.1
European officials	1.9
Athletes	1.8
American politician	1.8
Citizens	1.7
Serbian institution representative	1.5
Serbian state officials	1.5
US institution representative	1.3
Ivica Dačić	1.3
Public figures	1.2
Local self-governments	1.2
Council of Europe	1.0
European Parliament	1.0

In the monitoring period which included the reporting on Russia, the USA and the EU, Večernje Novosti mostly covered Vladimir Putin amidst his visit to Serbia. The second and third place was reserved for Serbian and US political leaders, Aleksandar Vučić and Donald Trump. The EU, epitomised in the European officials, was marginalized by Večernje novosti and thus placed at the bottom of our table.

Table 49 The most represented actors – Večernje novosti

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Vladimir Putin	6.0
Aleksandar Vučić	3.7
Donald Trump	3.2
Public figures	3.0
Experts	2.8
Foreign officials	2.4
US institution representatives	2.2
Citizens	2.1
Serbian state officials	1.9
Regional state officials	1.9
Athletes	1.7
European officials	1.7
Russian institution representatives	1.6
Ivica Dačić	1.3
Ana Brnabić	1.0
Church dignitaries	1.0

The model presented in the above monitoring analysis of dailies was also true for Blic. Truth be told, here the order was changed because Putin was placed first, Trump second, and Vučić took the third place. Unlike other daily newspapers, Blic featured a larger number of EU actors, although with somewhat lower presentation where such actors had more than 1% of presence on Blic pages.

Table 50 The most represented actors – Blic

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Vladimir Putin	4.7
Donald Trump	4.2
Aleksandar Vučić	4.1
Public figures	4.0
Experts	3.3
Citizens	2.8
US institution representatives	2.6
Foreign officials	2.6
Athletes	2.2
Ramush Haradinaj	2.0
Serbian state officials	1.7
Hashim Thaci	1.6
European officials	1.6
Ivica Dačić	1.5
Federica Mogherini	1.2
Russian institution representatives	1.1
Angela Merkel	1.1
Journalist as analyst	1.1
American media	1.0

Kurir also adopted the practice of not making Aleksandar Vučić a leading actor. In January 2019, Kurir gave more space to Putin and public figures mentioned in the articles on the USA, Russia and the EU. However, the presence of EU representatives was negligible.

Table 51. The most represented actors – Kurir

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Vladimir Putin	5.9
Public figures	4.9
Aleksandar Vučić	4.6
Donald Trump	4.4
Experts	2.7
US institution representatives	2.6
Athletes	2.5
Foreign officials	2.2
Citizens	2.1
European officials	2.0
American politician	1.9
Analyst	1.6
Serbian state officials	1.4
Serbian institution representatives	1.3
Russian institution representatives	1.2
Angela Merkel	1.1
Ramush Haradinaj	1.0

Kurir's reporting put the arrival of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin to Serbia, to the first place, despite rumours that this newspaper is very close to the President, Aleksandar Vučić. Foreign state officials (mostly Russian), experts, and Donald Trump all came before Aleksandar Vučić. This daily also marginalized the EU actors.

Table 52 The most represented actors – Informer

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Vladimir Putin	5.5
Foreign officials	4.5
Experts	4.2
Donald Trump	3.8
Public figures	3.8
Aleksandar Vučić	3.7
Citizens	3.5
US institution representatives	2.4
Athletes	2.4
Sergey Lavrov	1.7
Ramush Haradinaj	1.5
European officials	1.5
Russian institution representatives	1.4
Ivica Dačić	1.4
Analyst	1.3
Serbian state officials	1.3
American media	1.3
American experts	1.1
Vuk Jeremić	1.0

Srpski Telegraf closely followed the pattern of Informer. The arrival of Russian President to Serbia upstaged the President Vučić who, in almost all monitorings conducted since 2014, has been the most represented actor in the media. Public figures and Donald Trump were also more present than the Serbian President.

Table 53 The most represented actors – Srpski Telegraf

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Vladimir Putin	6.8
Donald Trump	5.7
Public figures	4.9
Aleksandar Vučić	4.3
Experts	4.1
Citizens	3.1
Foreign officials	2.9
US institution representative	2.7
Analyst	2.1
Athletes	1.6
American politician	1.6
Hashim Thaci	1.3
Serbian state officials	1.3
Serbian politicians	1.3
Ivica Dačić	1.2
European officials	1.2
Russian institution representatives	1.1
Regional state officials	1.1
Sergey Lavrov	1.1
Church dignitaries	1.1

In its coverage, Alo favoured the President of Russia. However, in the number of news items written on the USA, the EU and Russia, the Serbian President, Aleksandar Vučić closely followed. As opposed to other daily newspapers, Alo did not have much mention of the US President Trump. In their articles on the USA, they notably covered the representatives of US institutions. The EU representatives were not found among those who had 1% share in the total news items.

Table 54 The most represented actors – Alo

Actor	Percent of news items on the actor
Vladimir Putin	8.2
Aleksandar Vučić	5.3
Public figures	4.4
Citizens	3.5
Athletes	3.4
Experts	2.9
US institution representatives	2.3
Donald Trump	2.0
Ramush Haradinaj	1.9
Foreign officials	1.9
Local self-governments	1.6
Ivica Dačić	1.3
Hashim Thaci	1.2
NATO	1.2
Serbian state officials	1.2
Serbian politicians	1.2
Church dignitaries	1.2

Thematic analysis

Thematic analysis is expected to provide the picture of the manner in which the analysed daily newspapers presented life in the USA, the EU and Russia.

Previous findings, and the data provided in the Table 54 (showing that the editors of dailies used "bits and pieces" principle), created the impression of a diverse range of topics. However, shallow coverage of these topics made such diversity nonsensical and instead of turning it to an advantage, made it an obstacle.

Table 54 The most represented topics

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	13.5
Worldwide current events	6.4
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	5.9
Culture	4.9
US social life	4.7
Serbian internal politics	4.5
Entertainment	3.5
US internal politics	3.3
US foreign policy	2.7
Kosovo internal politics	2.5
Brussels Agreement	2.4
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	2.0
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	1.9
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.7
Regional relations	1.6
Brexit	1.6
Social life - Russia	1.5
Serbian economy	1.5
EU internal politics	1.4
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.3
Medical services - healthcare	1.3
Judicial system	1.3
Celebrations and commemorations	1.3
Church	1.2
Opposition	1.1
Relations between Macedonia and Greece	1.1
Life of Serbian citizens in the USA	1.1
Education/science	1.1
Near East	1.1
Crimes in Kosovo and Metohija	1.0
Republika Srpska and relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.0
Weaponry	1.0

The above topics reflect topicality. However, it is evident that when it came to daily current affairs, there was a so-called Kosovo package of topics that covered the issues concerning social life in the USA, the EU and Russia, and did not provide the Serbian readers with sufficient scope of information.

In addition to Kosovo, Serbia's key connection with the rest of the world was sport. This finding was true for Politika daily. Besides sport, there was a set of topics which may be placed in the "establishment" category (Serbian, American or Russian). These topics covered the events organized by, or related to the authorities. Again, the presence of social topics and current topics was negligible, with the exception of sport.

Table 55. The most represented topics–Politika

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	10.9
Worldwide current events	7.6
Culture	6.4
US internal politics	4.4
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	3.6
US foreign policy	3.3
Education/science	3.1
Serbian internal politics	2.9
Kosovo internal politics	2.8
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	2.7
Republika Srpska and relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.4
US social life	2.3
Serbian economy	2.3
Celebrations and commemorations	2.0
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.9
Church	1.9
EU internal politics	1.7
Brussels Agreement	1.7
Regional relations	1.7
Energy	1.7
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.5
Judicial system	1.5
Near East	1.5
Russian foreign policy	1.3
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	1.3
Relations between Macedonia and Greece	1.3
Social life - Russia	1.2
Medical services - healthcare	1.2
Weaponry	1.2
Infrastructure	1.1

The relationship between the topics which reflected the priorities of the establishment and the topics which reflected social needs was somewhat less visible in Danas daily. Namely, the editorial policy of Danas enabled the readers a somewhat more extensive information about social life in the USA, Russia and the EU. Danas also placed considerable focus on Kosovo topics or the issues that could be included in the Chapter 35.

Table 56 The most represented topics–Danas

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Serbian internal politics	13.9
Sport	12.9
Worldwide current events	7.6
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	7.6
Culture	4.3
US internal politics	2.7
Brussels Agreement	2.7
EU internal politics	2.4
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	2.2
Media and media freedoms	2.2
Serbian economy	2.2
US foreign policy	2.0
Serbia's EU integration	1.8
Judicial system	1.6
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.4
Brexit	1.4
Relations between Macedonia and Greece	1.4
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	1.3
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	1.3
Opposition	1.3
Assassination of Oliver Ivanović	1.3
Celebrations and commemorations	1.3
US social life	1.1
Regional relations	1.1
Tentative solution for Kosovo	1.1
Tourism	1.1
In memoriam	1.1
Crimes in Kosovo and Metohija	1.1

Again, Novosti daily did not considerably differ from the described model of reporting on the EU, the USA and Russia. However, one thing that was not present in the other newspapers catches the eye – reporting on diaspora i.e. citizens of Serbia who left for the USA to seek their fortune. Večernje novosti contained the news items dealing with the social life in Serbia or in the EU, the USA and Russia.

Table 57 The most represented topics– Večernje novosti

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	10.9
US social life	7.2
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	6.1
Culture	5.9
Worldwide current events	5.5
Entertainment	4.9
Serbian internal politics	2.9
Kosovo internal politics	2.7
US internal politics	2.5
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	2.4
Medical services - healthcare	2.4
Serbian economy	2.2
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	2.2
Regional relations	1.8
Church	1.8
US foreign policy	1.7
Tourism	1.7
Life of Serbian citizens in the USA	1.5
Brussels Agreement	1.5
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.5
Brexit	1.5
Judicial system	1.5
Weaponry	1.5
Celebrations and commemorations	1.5
Social life - Russia	1.2
Education/science	1.2
Economy, businessmen	1.2
Relations between Macedonia and Greece	1.2
Republika Srpska and relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.2
Crimes in Kosovo and Metohija	1.2
Energy	1.0

Similarly as Novosti, Blic covered the topics dealing with social life, in addition to the topics coming from governmental and institutional establishment and those coming from a so-called Chapter 35. However, EU-related topics were lacking.

Table 58 The most represented topics– Blic

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	14.1
Culture	5.4
Serbian internal politics	4.8
Entertainment	4.6
US foreign policy	4.1
US internal politics	3.9
US social life	3.9
Worldwide current events	3.5
Kosovo internal politics	3.5
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	3.1
Brussels Agreement	2.9
Brexit	2.9
Life of Serbian citizens in the USA	2.7
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	2.5
Problems within the EU/resolving process	2.3
EU internal politics	2.1
Social life - Russia	1.9
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.5
Judicial system	1.5
Relations between Macedonia and Greece	1.5
Regional relations	1.2
Serbian economy	1.2
Official relations between Serbia and the USA	1.2
Crimes in Kosovo and Metohija	1.2
Russian foreign policy	1.0
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	1.0
Near East	1.0
Medical services - healthcare	1.0
Weaponry	1.0
Celebrations and commemorations	1.0
IT, Internet, digitalization	1.0

Sport, social life in the USA, official relations between Serbia and Russia, and US internal politics dominated January editions of Kurir daily and its articles on the USA, Russia and the EU. We could also conclude that Kurir brushed aside the topics concerning the EU integration.

Table 58 The most represented topics– Kurir

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	14.4
US social life	8.7
Worldwide current events	5.9
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	5.4
US internal politics	4.5
Brussels Agreement	4.5
Culture	4.5
Entertainment	3.7
US foreign policy	2.5
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	2.5
Serbian internal politics	2.5
Kosovo internal politics	2.2
Brexit	2.0
Celebrations and commemorations	2.0
Social life - Russia	1.7
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	1.7
Medical services - healthcare	1.7
EU internal politics	1.2
Regional relations	1.2
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.2
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.0
Education/science	1.0
Tentative solution for Kosovo	1.0
Tourism	1.0
Near East	1.0
Relations between Macedonia and Greece	1.0
Weaponry	1.0
Church	1.0

Informer differed from the other analysed dailies in the fact that in its news items on the EU, the USA and Russia, it covered the issues of opposition, with somewhat lower presence of social topics.

Table 59 The most represented topics– Informer

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	16.0
Worldwide current events	7.4
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	7.1
US social life	6.5
Entertainment	6.2
Opposition	3.6
Kosovo internal politics	3.0
US internal politics	2.7
US foreign policy	2.7
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	2.7
Brussels Agreement	2.7
Social life - Russia	2.4
Near East	1.8
Crimes in Kosovo and Metohija	1.8
Russian foreign policy	1.5
Serbia's EU integration	1.5
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.5
Brexit	1.5
Culture	1.5
Medical services - healthcare	1.5
IT, Internet, digitalization	1.2
Interference of the USA and international community into the internal politics of the Balkans	1.2
Serbian internal politics	1.2

During the monitoring period, Srpski telegraf reported on the USA, the EU and Russia more than the other media, covering the topics of not only sport but also entertainment and culture.

Table 60 The most represented topics– Srpski telegraf

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	12.6
Worldwide current events	7.8
US social life	6.8
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	6.8
Culture	5.5
Entertainment	5.3
US internal politics	4.5
Social life - Russia	3.0
US foreign policy	3.0
Regional relations	3.0
Brussels Agreement	2.3
Problems within the EU/resolving process	2.3
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	2.0
Brexit	2.0
Church	2.0
Kosovo internal politics	2.0
Opposition	1.8
Russian foreign policy	1.5
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.5
Serbian internal politics	1.5
EU internal politics	1.3
Internal politics of Russia	1.0
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and USA	1.0
Serbia's EU integration	1.0
Judicial system	1.0
Tentative solution for Kosovo	1.0
Weaponry	1.0
Crimes in Kosovo and Metohija	1.0

Sport and entertainment, coupled with the reporting on social life in the USA and relations between Russia and Serbia, were the main topics covered by Alo daily.

Table 61 The most represented topics– Alo

Topics	Percent of topic representation
Sport	20.9
Official relations between Serbia and Russia	10.1
Entertainment	6.8
Worldwide current events	4.9
Serbian internal politics	4.3
US social life	3.8
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and Russia	3.3
Kosovo internal politics	3.3
Serbian foreign policy toward everyone	3.0
Culture	3.0
Life of Serbian citizens in the USA	2.2
Opposition	2.2
US foreign policy	1.9
Medical services - healthcare	1.9
Social life - Russia	1.6
Brussels Agreement	1.6
Regional relations	1.6
Social and economic cooperation between Serbia and the EU	1.4
Problems within the EU/resolving process	1.1
Kosovo beyond Brussels - life in Kosovo	1.1
Official relations between Serbia and the USA	1.1

CONCLUSION

Six-month monitoring of media reporting undoubtedly showed that the media in Serbia abandoned their genuine function (not only in the electoral process) and turned into the means of conveying reports, promotion and propaganda, whichever suited the interests of authorities.

Five-month monitoring of reporting made by television stations within their primetime news found that:

- ✚ RTS, TV Pink and TV Happy were television stations which produced most reports on the monitoring subject
- ✚ Informative genre forms were predominant
- ✚ Events organized by authorities in the USA, the EU, Russia and Serbia dominated the analysed news items, with noticeable presence of TV Pink reports on a small number of pseudo-events
- ✚ Analysed television stations turned themselves into conveyors of information i.e. readers of news items produced in newsrooms or extracted from the press releases of domestic and foreign actors
- ✚ The largest number of news items mentioned the USA, the EU and Russia, whereas the news items on Serbia and its relations with the USA, the EU and Russia took the second place.
- ✚ The most present actor was the USA, which was represented almost twice as much as the EU and Russia
- ✚ Facts presented in the form of information about when something happened or will happen i.e. the views of statesmen/officials and experts, positions of the EU, US, Serbian and Russian institutions, were the main lines of arguments that journalists used in the analysed news items.
- ✚ Predominant tone of primetime news reports on the USA, the EU and Russia was neutral
- ✚ Russia, as an actor, was presented in two times and tree times more positive tone than the EU and the USA, respectively
- ✚ Aleksandar Vučić, Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin were three dominant actors that were included in the largest number of news reports.
- ✚ Kosovo was the main topic of the monitored news items. It was followed by sport, Serbian foreign policy and regional relations. The topic of European integration was presented marginally.

One-month monitoring of daily press conducted in January 2019, when Serbia was visited by the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, did not show any significant deviation from the findings obtained in the monitoring of primetime news. Key findings concerning the monitoring of daily newspapers and their reporting on the USA, the EU and Russia are as follows:

- ✚ Politika, Večernje novosti and Danas had the largest number of news items that were the subject of monitoring, whereas the front pages of Politika, Blic and Večernje novosti had the largest number of announcements for their news items on the USA, the EU and Russia;
- ✚ When it came to the discourse of the headlines, there was a clear separation. While Politika, Večernje novosti, Blic and Danas mostly had informative and info-critical headlines, other analysed dailies such as Kurir, Informer, Srpski telegraf and Alo accounted for one third or one fourth of sensationalist headlines;
- ✚ Srpski telegraf, Alo, Informer and Kurir were daily papers containing the largest number of panic-provoking headlines;
- ✚ In the analysed daily press, informative genre forms were predominant;
- ✚ The news items that were subject to monitoring were based on events organized by authorities or conventional social events, whereas pseudo-events were mostly covered by Kurir and Infomer;
- ✚ Serbia and its relations with the USA, the EU and Russia comprised the main framework of actors. Half of the news items were dedicated to them;
- ✚ Due to the fact that at the time of monitoring Vladimir Putin was visiting Serbia, he was the most present actor, as opposed to his representation on television stations. This conclusion does not apply to Politika daily where his representation placed him second, behind the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić;
- ✚ Daily press used almost the same tone of reporting. A predominant tone of reporting on the USA, the EU and Russia was neutral;
- ✚ Russia was three times and four times more positively presented than the EU and the USA, respectively;
- ✚ Thematic framework was comprised of: sport, worldwide current events, relations between Russia and Serbia, culture and social life in the USA
- ✚ Daily newspapers also marginalized the EU integration outside the Chapter 35 - resolving Kosovo issue

In addition to monitoring, our analysis also included public opinion poll aimed at citizens' views of media reporting on the USA, the EU, and Russia.

Only every fourth respondent thought that the reporting of Serbian media was objective. The objective reporting was perceived by those older than 65, respondents with primary school and secondary school qualifications, and those who in the coming elections would choose to vote for the Serbian Progressive Party.

When asked to evaluate the reporting on the USA, the EU and Russia in relation to the policy of these countries, majority of respondents found that the reporting on the USA and the EU was either objective or negative, as opposed to the reporting on Russia where the majority of respondents found that it was more positive than its policy toward Serbia deserves.

From the above we can conclude that the findings of the 2017 media monitoring were repeated, namely, the reporting of the analysed media in the research period was:

- ✚ Pro-government as opposed to pro-social - key actors, topics and events notably came from the sphere of government and authority of Serbia in particular, but also from the USA, Russia and the EU;
- ✚ Pro-Russian – Russian actors had the most positive presentation;
- ✚ Promotional and propagandist - reporting was characterized by conveying positive information in the form of reports on actors coming from the USA, the EU and Russia

Excessive reporting on leaders – reporting on the USA and Russia was reduced to the reporting on the Presidents of the USA, Russia and Serbia

Putinisation – was reflected in two forms. One was the reporting of Serbian media, mostly tabloids, which portrayed Vladimir Putin as a protector of Serbia. The other form were the statements of the highest government officials who were taking advantage of positive feelings toward Russia hoping that Putin's acclaim would rub off on them

Marginalization of accession negotiations with the EU - reporting on the Serbia's European integration and the representation of topics and actors

Zoran Gavrilović

PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT MEDIA COVERAGE

In addition to monitoring of the media concerning the reporting on the USA, Russia and the EU, BIRODI researched public opinion about the above subject. Our respondents were firstly asked to generally evaluate the objectivity of Serbian media reporting on worldwide current affairs.

Table 1 Evaluation of Serbian media objectivity concerning the reporting on worldwide current affairs (in %)

N (number)	Completely	Mostly	Partly	Low	Not at all	No answer
1006	10	17.8	41	15.9	7.7	7.6

Out of 1006 research subjects, only 27.8% of them thought that the Serbian media reported objectively.

It is interesting to note that the respondents older than 65 perceived the Serbian media, in a statistically more significant manner, as objective in their reporting on worldwide current affairs.

On the other hand, the respondents aged between 40 and 49 found that there was no objectivity in the media coverage of worldwide current affairs.

Table 2 Evaluation of Serbian media objectivity concerning the reporting on worldwide current affairs depending on age (in %)

	Sample	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+
N (number)	1006	197	162	164	285	197
Completely	8.8	9.5	6.9	3.9	7.1	16.2
Mostly	11.5	10.2	10.3	10.8	5.2	23.5
Partly	32.6	37.4	32.8	22.7	36.8	29.6
Low	16.9	20.9	7.1	12.5	15.9	9.4

Similarly to the previous finding, the respondents of lower educational background graded media objectivity higher than the respondents with higher education level, who found that the information of worldwide current affairs provided by the Serbian media was less objective.

Table 3 Evaluation of Serbian media objectivity concerning the reporting on worldwide current affairs depending on the level of education (in %)

	Sample	Primary school and lower	Secondary school	College and university degree
N (number)	1006	328	504	174
Completely	8.8	14.9	6.7	3.1
Mostly	11.5	12.6	13.6	3.3
Partly	32.6	33.3	33.7	28
Low	16.9	17.5	15.6	19.3
Not at all	23.5	10.1	25	44.3
No answer	6.8	11.6	5.3	2

The evaluation of objectivity regarding media coverage of worldwide current affairs differed depending on the region. The respondents coming from the Southern and Eastern Serbia felt, to a statistically more significant extent, that the reporting was completely objective.

Similar research finding was true for the respondents living in the Western part of Serbia and in Šumadija region. Their opinion that the objectiveness of information was low statistically goes below the average, namely, they were less in accord regarding low objectivity of information about worldwide current affairs published by the Serbian media.

On the other hand, the respondents living in Belgrade saw things quite differently. Namely, these respondents saw the reporting of Serbian media on the worldwide current affairs as unobjective to a statistically significant extent.

Table 4 Evaluation of Serbian media objectivity concerning the reporting on worldwide current affairs – place of residence of the respondents (in %)

	Sample	Vojvodina	Belgrade	Western Serbia and Šumadija	Eastern and Southern Serbia
N (number)	1006	271	235	285	215
Completely	8.8	7.9	1.9	8.1	18.4
Mostly	11.5	12.4	13.4	11.3	8.5
Partly	32.6	28.6	24.4	39.1	37.9
Low	16.9	13.9	14.5	23.4	14.7
Not at all	23.5	28	39.3	14.1	13
No answer	6.8	9.2	6.6	4.1	7.5

When the findings of the perceived objectivity of Serbian media reporting on worldwide current affairs are compared by (non)watching of TV News, one can clearly see the prevailing trends.

The respondents who watched the News of RTS found the reporting of the Serbian media on the worldwide current affairs objective, to a statistically more significant extent. On the other hand, there were those who watched the News of N1, or did not watch the News at all, and their views were opposite from those of RTS News viewers. They found that the information of the worldwide current affairs conveyed by the Serbian media was unobjective.

Table 5 Evaluation of Serbian media objectivity concerning the reporting on worldwide current affairs depending on News watching (in %)

	Sample	RTS	Pink	Prva	O2	Happy	N1	I don't watch these News
N (number)	1006	386	128	91	33	27	109	232
Completely	8.8	11.9	13.2	9.9		35.4	1.3	2.5
Mostly	11.5	19.4	13.2	2.2	13.4	6.9	0.9	6.2
Partly	32.6	34.1	38.7	53.8	41.1	54.8	20.2	20.3
Low	16.9	10.8	14.2	24.2		2.4	19.3	28.5
Not at all	23.5	17	16.3	9.7	45.5	0.6	58.4	26.9
No answer	6.8	6.8	4.4	0.3	0	0	0	15.6

The respondents who felt that Serbia should join the EU and NATO had a statistically less negative attitude to reporting objectivity, whereas the respondents who thought that Serbia should join the Eurasian Union expressed medium satisfaction with objectivity, which was statistically considerably above the average of all respondents who thought that the Serbian media were partly objective concerning their reporting on worldwide current affairs.

Table 6 Evaluation of Serbian media objectivity concerning the reporting on worldwide current affairs depending on the preferred foreign policy (in %)

		EU and NATO	Only EU	Only Eurasian Union	Should not join EU, NATO, or Eurasian Union
N (number)	1006	22	456	177	350
Completely and mostly satisfied	20.3	3.7	20.9	18.4	21.5
Partly satisfied	32.6	22.7	31.3	48.4	26.9
Low satisfaction or not satisfied at all	40.4	73.6	40	29.4	44.3
No answer	6.8	0	7.8	3.8	7.4

When it comes to voter preferences, it can be concluded that the respondents who would vote for parties in power were of the opinion that the reporting of the media was objective, as opposed to the respondents who will either abstain from voting or will vote for the opposition parties, save for the voters of the Serbian Radical Party.

Table 7 Evaluation of Serbian media objectivity concerning the reporting on worldwide current affairs depending on voter preferences (in %)

		I am indecisive	Will not vote	Doesn't want to say	Serbian Progressive Party	Socialist Party of Serbia	Alliance for Serbia	Movement of Free Citizens	Serbian Radical Party	Civic Front	Salvation	Liberal Democratic Party
N (number)	1006	111	193	27	356	42	107	27	17	37	29	23
Completely and mostly satisfied	20.3	14.6	13.1	19.3	33.1	23	5.2	25.2	18.7	18.6		0.7
Partly satisfied	32.6	32.2	40.6	32.7	38.5	32.7	7.3	34.4	72.2	20.4	30.2	
Low satisfaction or not satisfied at all	40.4	33.6	34.3	44.5	23	41.2	85.6	40.4	9.2	61.1	69.8	99.3
No answer	6.8	19.6	12	3.5	5.3	3	1.8					

Second part of the research related to the analysis of perceived reporting on the three key actors of our media monitoring: USA, EU and Russia coverage in the News. The research included only those respondents who said that they watched the News.

Table 8 Evaluation of the relevance of Serbian media reporting on the USA, the EU and Russia (in %)

	N (number)	More negative than it is	Objective	More positive than it is	No answer
SAD	774	31.7	38.8	18	11.5
EU	774	35	34.8	16	14.1
Russia	774	4.3	38.5	42.9	14.2

The research participants generally felt that the media coverage on the USA was objective, however, almost one third of the respondents thought that in majority of cases, the Serbian media presented the US policy to Serbia as more negative than it is. The same was true for the EU. When Russia was concerned, the situation was quite the opposite. Only 5 respondents thought that the reporting of the Serbian media on the Serbian policy to Russia was more negative than when it came to the Russian policy to Serbia. Four out of ten respondents found that the Serbian media presented Russian policy to Serbia as more positive than it actually is.

When it comes to media reporting on the US policy to Serbia, there are some specific and statistically relevant characteristics, as follows:

- Statistically, young people aged between 19 and 28 perceived the reporting on the US policy to Serbia as more objective (58.8%); Older respondents, over 65 years of age, perceived the media reporting on the US policy to Serbia as negative, to a statistically greater extent (42.2%);
- The respondents with higher educational background perceived the media reporting on the US policy to Serbia as more positive;
- Respondents living in Belgrade felt, to a statistically greater extent (30.2%), that the media reported on the US policy to Serbia as being more positive than it is;
- Survey participants, who claimed to watch RTS News, felt that the reporting on the USA was more negative than the US policy to Serbia (38%), which is statistically considerably above sample average. In

addition, the respondents who watch N1 News thought that the US policy to Serbia was presented more positively (43%) than it is.

When the EU and the USA were compared at the level of age groups, there were no differences. Evaluations were similar, with minor deviations which will be highlighted here.

Thus, the respondents aged 29 thought, to a statistically more significant extent (59.9%), that media in Serbia objectively report on the EU compared to the policy that the EU has to Serbia. In terms of the regions, the respondents living in the Western Serbia and Šumadija region felt that the reporting on the EU was more negative than the policy the EU carries out to Serbia (42%). The viewers of RTS News thought that the reporting on the EU, when compared to its policy to Serbia, was more negative (48%), which is statistically considerably above the average evaluation at the sample level. On the other hand, those who watched Pink News had the opposite views. Statistically, there was a smaller number of them who thought that the media negatively report on the EU policy to Serbia.

The respondents with college and university degree (23%) found that Russia was presented more positively than its policy to Serbia actually is. As regards regional aspect, there were more respondents from the Western Serbia (7%) who thought that the reporting on Russia was more negative than its policy to Serbia.

Regarding the evaluated reporting on Russia, the respondents who watched N1 felt, to a statistically significant level, that the reporting on Russia was objective and not more positive compared to Serbia, as seen by majority research participants.

Dražen Pavlica

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS GLOBAL TRIANGLE (USA, EU, RUSSIA) IN POLITICAL TALK SHOWS

Introductory Remarks

The Bureau for Social Research monitored electronic media from August to December 2018. In addition to primetime news of free-to-air television networks, the research sample also included the telecasts of political talk shows. One cannot help but notice that the monitored TV networks do not air a sufficient number of political talk shows. Whereas the other free-to-air TV channels may be partly and formally excused for such situation, this by no means can be true for the public broadcaster. Truth be told, the largest number of political talk shows can be seen on RTS, however, the question can be raised as to whether they serve their purpose. Finally, an insufficient number of political TV talk shows is not so much a problem but rather the advanced stage of their futility and their essential irrelevance for the political arena.

Research Subject And Objectives

Our monitoring was focused on the topic of Serbia/Kosovo in a global triangle (Russia, EU, USA) and this topic forced us to focus the subject of our research only on those political talk shows that, at least partly, fitted into our relevant framework. Here, it will be worth noting that because of the actual speed of developments in Kosovo and its surroundings, the media discourse of analysed political shows was mainly focused on the mentioned toponym.

In the beginning, we would like to point out that the objective of this research was to analyse the manner in which three global actors were presented in the observed political talk shows. Consequently, we will shed light on whether the treatment of the USA, the EU and Russia was impartial, nuanced and analytical. And finally, we will pay attention to whether the reality constructed by the media in relation to the said global entities reflects a prevailing political, social and cultural understanding in Serbia.

As an outcome of this research activity, we will produce a discursive map, giving equal attention to the most frequent statements and those that were quite distinctive. Such a discursive map with charted statements certainly has its centrepiece, but also its margins that offer vantage point for more autonomous analysis. Therefore, our aim is not to count the statements which have a certain content and prefix, but to show different ways in which the USA, the EU and Russia are portrayed. The map so arranged will highlight prevailing discourse patterns and value vectors against the mentioned global actors.

Television Channel/Show Sample

As previously mentioned, our sample included political TV talk shows of national free-to-air television channels which dealt with Serbia/Kosovo in a trinomial global context. The period of analysis was November and December 2018¹. It will be shown that out of five national free-to-air television channels, only two offered a certain kind of political talk shows that potentially fitted into our sample. As one might expect, these are RTS as a public broadcaster, on the one hand, and TV Happy, on the other. RTS had a larger number of political talk shows dealing with the thematic circle of our interest, whereas TV Happy had one such show, *Cyrillic (Ćirilica)*. Although RTS telecasted a leading number of political TV talk shows, *Cyrillic* proved to be more abundant for the research purposes. Eventually, our sample was comprised of four *Cyrillic* editions (TV Happy), six *Questionnaire (Upitnik)* editions and one edition of *Yes Perhaps Not (Da, možda ne)* (RTS). As it will be shown, that was quite enough to obtain a discursive/narratively deeper insight into what kind of image of the three global actors Serbian (electronic) media generate.

Methodical Guidelines

As opposed to the prevailing segment of our research, which required as precise quantification as possible, when it came to political talk shows our research tasks were set quite differently. We were interested to see how the discourses of the subject global entities were shaped and how they functioned. Equal attention was paid to the participants in the discursive constructions of the global triangle. In view of the above, we paid attention to vocabulary and figures of speech used in the public media when shaping discourses about the EU, the USA and Russia. Although the research subject was media landscape, a wider social contextualization of the media was required. It was to be expected that proportionally established imagology of all three mentioned global entities would also be projected through the media discourse. Since it originates from the sphere of philology, imagology interprets discursive statements and breaks down the representations of various collective identities.

Our task was to detect the “interpretative repertoires” of participants in the analysed shows that relate to the global trinity (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 149). We will separately show the manner in which the analysed shows presented the USA, the EU and Russia, and this will not be only for your easy reference. As kind of a double-entry bookkeeping, we will provide analytical insights along the *pro et contra* axis. It will be helpful to ask whether there will be statements of these global actors that cannot be uniquely assigned to any of the two poles. Generally speaking, such statements are, of course, possible, but we felt that patterns of polemics used here leave little room for unqualified classification. The equation of

¹ The sample of analysed political talk shows also included one episode of *Cyrillic* broadcast in the very beginning of January 2019. The topic and the panel of participants were so invaluable for our discourse analysis that we extended the analysis period until 7 January 2019, when *Cyrillic* was on.

the psychopolitics in Serbia contains strong emotions, and this equally applies to the attitude toward the USA, the EU, and Russia.

Conceptual Preliminaries

Preliminary research activities always call for the explanations of certain terms. Firstly, the mentioned global trinity may be reduced to duality since the toponym *the West* encompasses, among other things, the USA and the EU. When it comes to these three converging terms (the West, the USA and the EU) synecdoche is often used². Thus, the mention of the EU/Europe or the USA/America actually means the West - a fluid and expansive civilisation circle which certainly includes the other parts of mankind, as well. On the other hand, the USSR is often discursively reduced to a single national and/or state component which is, understandably, Russia.

At the same time, for the purposes of theory and research, it would be highly unjustified to overlook the difference between Europe and the EU. Referring to Husserl's (Edmund Husserl) reasoning, Douzinas (Costas Douzinas) points out that the idea of Europe carries a universal drive. This has been greatly decomposed in the EU practices which, as we agree with Douzinas, is the expression of "instrumentalization of the reason" (Douzinas, 2016: 269). As French poet, Paul Valéry, once concluded (geosymbolically), Europe was born of three sources: Athens, Jerusalem and Rome³ (Todorov, 2014: 218). In short, it is not just an inconsistent conceptual scope, but a major clash of ideas between Europe and the EU.

Analytics

Discourse Participants

It was our imperative to see who the participants of the analysed shows were and to attempt to somehow assign them to a particular group. Five participants appeared twice in one of the analysed political shows. On the one hand, Nebojša Čović⁴, Borisav Jović⁵ and Miroslav Lazanski⁶ appeared in *Cyrillic* and

² According to the definition of the *Dictionary of Literary Terms*, synecdoche is substitution of „one word (term) for another word (term) based on their interdependence and logical connection (Krnjević, 1992: 777).

³ Swiss philosopher, Denys Louis de Rougemont believes that Persians (doctrine of good and evil), Arabs (idea of love in their poetry) and Celts (mysticism) were also poured into the spiritual matrix of Europe) (Todorov, 2014: 219).

⁴ In *Cyrillic*, he was presented as an official of the Basketball Club Red Star and a former Belgrade Mayor, whereas in *Questionnaire*, Nebojša Čović was announced as a former President of the Coordinating Centre for Kosovo and Metohija.

⁵ In both cases Borisav Jović was presented as a former President of the SFRY Presidency.

⁶ While in *Cyrillic* Miroslav Lazanski was a writer, journalist and military and political analyst, in *Questionnaire* he was reduced to a military commentator of *Politika* daily.

Questionnaire, while, on the other, Marko Đurić⁷ and Zoran Lutovac⁸ were featured in *Questionnaire* and *Yes Perhaps Not*.

At first glance, it could be concluded that none of the guests in *Cyrillic* was announced as a representative of a political party. As opposed to that, nearly half of the participants in *Questionnaire* and *Yes Perhaps Not* appeared as the representatives of their parties. In addition, in some instances, the *Questionnaire* and *Yes Perhaps Not* featured the participants who were presented as the members of an institution or as scientists, even though they were the prominent figures of their parties (Marko Đurić, Nikola Selaković⁹, Milovan Drecun¹⁰, Predrag Marković¹¹, Veljko Odalović¹²). Finally, one could not help but notice that Miroslav Lazanski (elected a Republican MP from the list of candidates of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party), was presented in the *Questionnaire* as a military commentator of *Politika* daily.

The representatives of the opposition parties also participated in the analysed political talk shows of the public broadcaster. Along with the aforementioned Zoran Lutovac, the President of the Serbian Radical Party Vojislav Seselj, the Serbian Democratic Party President Miloš Jovanovic, and the President of Liberal Democratic Party Čedomir Jovanović also made their appearance. The following appeared in the role of the representatives of ruling parties: Milenko Jovanov (Vice President of the Main Board of the Serbian Progressive Party), Đorđe Komlenski (member of the Presidency of the Movement of Socialists), Zoran Anđelković (member of the Main Board of the Socialist Party of Serbia), Vuk Drašković (President of the Serbian Renewal Movement), Igor Simić (Vice President of the Serbian List) and Dejan Radenković (MP of the Socialist Party of Serbia).

In addition to the abovementioned, the talk shows of RTS also featured a historian, Čedomir Antić¹³, Vladimir Jovanović, a former FRY ambassador to the United Nations, and Milorad Pupovac, a President of the Serbian National Council in Croatia. This completes the list of all guests who participated in the two analysed RTS shows and the same thing should also be applied to *Cyrillic* telecast on TV Happy.

⁷ In both *Questionnaire* and *Yes Perhaps Not* Marko Đurić was announced as a Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija.

⁸ As in the case of Marko Đurić, in both shows aired by RTS Zoran Lutovac was presented as a President of the Democratic Party.

⁹ *Questionnaire* announced Nikola Selaković, the Presidency member of the Serbian Progressive Party, as a Secretary General of the President of the Republic of Serbia.

¹⁰ Milovan Drecun, Republican MP of the Serbian Progressive Party, was announced as a Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Kosovo and Metohija.

¹¹ Deputy President of the Socialist Party of Serbia was presented in *Questionnaire* as a historian.

¹² Presidency member of the Socialist Party of Serbia participated in *Questionnaire* in the capacity of a Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹³ Those who are at least a little bit informed about the political life in Serbia are well familiar with the oppositional political activism of Čedomir Antić.

In four analysed *Cyrillic* episodes, there were seventeen guests in total, of which three (Nebojša Čović, Miroslav Lazanski, Borisav Jović) were previously mentioned. The fact that, as we have said, no guest in *Cyrillic* was presented as a member /official of a political party does not mean that there were not any. Although presented as a historian and an associate professor of the Faculty of Philosophy, Miloš Ković is also a prominent member of the Democratic Party of Serbia. Furthermore, Božidar Delić was announced as a retired General of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro, despite also being a Serbian Radical Party official. In addition, Petar Petković was presented as a member of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija but was also known to the public as a prominent member of the Serbian Progressive Party. Among the remaining guests, there were four persons, who in addition to Božidar Delić, participated in military actions on the territory of the former SFRY. Those were Veselin Šljivančanin, a retired Yugoslav Army Colonel, Dragoslav Bokan, a War Commander¹⁴, Milan Jolović Legenda, a former commander of the special squad *The Drina Wolves* and Vinko Pandurević¹⁵, a retired General. Out of all guests in all three analysed political talk shows, only *Cyrillic* featured a woman, Danica Maksimović, a former investigative judge. The remaining participants made the talk show *Cyrillic* formally and personally diverse: Velibor Džomić, the Archpriest and member of the High Ecclesiastical Court, Slobodan Lekić, a Brussels correspondent¹⁶, Slobodan Reljić, a journalist and former editor-in-chief of NIN weekly, Aleksandar Pavić, an expert in geopolitical relations and a political scientist, Darko Tanasković, a former UNESCO ambassador, and Srđa Trifković, a historian and a publicist.

After counting, we arrived at forty guests in total. More precisely, there were thirty five of them, since in five cases the same individuals were the guests in two different shows. Potentially, this makes thirty five different views about a given topic. Naturally, for the research purposes, it would not be justified to omit to pay attention to the discourse used by the hosts of the analysed shows. This is particularly true for *Cyrillic* where the host actually interferes with the flow of discussion and, additionally, *Cyrillic* runs well above the average, much more than two hours. The fact that we are not going to present the views of all those who participated in the analysed shows stems from the fact that some of them did not even touch upon the given topics.

Discourses And Narrations

In the sections that follow, we will deal with the United States and the EU individually (not just for research purposes), regardless of the fact that they were often intentionally matched. Let us first start from the USA, the actors that, as agreed by all, decisively influence local geopolitical dilemma. When it comes to

¹⁴ We precisely presented the way they were announced in *Cyrillic*. In addition to being presented as a war commander, Dragoslav Bokan was also signed as a publicist, a writer and a film director.

¹⁵ In addition to being called a General, Vinko Pandurević was also signed as a PhD in Sociology.

¹⁶ Later in the show we learned that this vague term meant a reporter of an American army journal.

geopolitical, military and strategic discourses, which were the most present ones in the analysed political talk shows, there is a good reason for the term *the West* to be placed in the US-related section.

The Usa

As already mentioned, we will present and separate the statements which took a critical view of the USA from those which contained praise. We reckon that negative statements require to be first analysed given their number and diversity. Here, it should be clarified that, as a rule, NATO will be linked to the USA because, evidently, the said military alliance merges with the mentioned (military) superpower.

When it comes to the US attitude to Serbia in the post-Yugoslav era, according to Srđa Trifković¹⁷, who appeared in *Cyrillic* on 3 December 2018, "there has been a continuity of anti-Serb sentiment expressed by the State Department since early 1990s".

In the same edition of *Cyrillic*, Darko Tanasković said that during the war in B&H, he overheard a discussion with US officials that the Serbs "would heavily pay for waging the war against the will of the USA".

The critics of the USA feel that Serbia, most of all Kosovo, is recognised by the USA as a model example of US colonial and imperial aspirations. They went so far in defaming the USA that even its comparison with 1930s Germany was not considered exaggerated. Thus, in *Cyrillic* aired on 10 December 2018, a political scientist, Aleksandar Pavić, drew several analogies from present-time USA and the Nazi Germany. The composition of guests in the mentioned *Cyrillic*¹⁸, as well as the very standpoint taken by the host, was such that they elaborated on, and added to what they were saying without actually expressing any opposing views of the USA. Accordingly, another guest, Slobodan Reljić, found that the present power-holders in the US are just like the Nazis. According to Reljić, the Nazi model of retaliation used in the World War 2 was revived in the case of the Serbs, more precisely, in the case of those accused of committing war crimes in the former SFRY. Namely, this guest transposed that into a statement "they accused one hundred Serbs and then caught one Gotovina". The foregoing bears weight considering the statement of Milomir Marić, the host of this episode of *Cyrillic*, who said in disillusionment: "We naively believed that the USA was a realm of freedom", adding that "the American Dream has vanished into thin air".

The *Cyrillic* aired on 7 January 2019¹⁹ was again focused on Kosovo, whereas the very title of the show, *The Fate of Humankind Shall Be Resolved in Kosovo!*

¹⁷ *Cyrillic* also featured Darko Tanasković, Miroslav Lazanski and Borisav Jović.

¹⁸ In addition to Aleksandar Pavić, this episode of *Cyrillic* featured Slobodan Reljić, Danica Maksimović, Milan Jolović Legenda and Vinko Pandurević.

¹⁹ The guests were Velibor Džomić, Miloš Ković, Nebojša Čović and Slobodan Lekić.

clearly showed that the focus was placed on geopolitical frameworks. Having in mind the current geopolitical architecture, in the discussions about Kosovo the greatest importance was attached to the USA. Moreover, the West was the culprit of many adverse processes and events in Kosovo, as pointed out by Veljko Odalović in *Questionnaire* of 13 November 2018²⁰. In addition to the fact that the West "has created a criminal terrorist KLA", according to Odalović, "it has tolerated expulsions, kidnappings and killings of the Serbs since 1999".

In *Questionnaire* of 18 December 2018²¹, Zoran Anđelković attributed the responsibility for the Albanians acting like "spoiled brats" to the USA and, partly, to England. In the same show, Marko Đurić pointed out that the Americans are both "mom and dad" to the Albanians. Infantilization and paternalization of the Albanians occurred quite often with the purpose to criticise their patrons, notably the USA. Thus, in *Questionnaire* of 27 November 2018²², Nebojša Čović concluded that Priština looked to the mentioned mentors to devise plans for them since the Albanians were not capable of doing that on their own. Finally, Zoran Anđelković referred to Kissinger claiming that the Americans have had the plan for independent Kosovo for thirty years now. According to Drecun, who was a guest in the mentioned *Questionnaire* of 27 November 2018, it is not just about Kosovo but about a geopolitical concept centred around the project of Greater Albania.

In *Cyrillic* of 7 January 2019, a historian, Miloš Ković, presented the past and present of the USA in a Manichean manner, greatly along the same lines as Pavić and Reljić did in *Cyrillic* of 10 December 2018. All American myths, including the "myth of being the chosen ones" were created to cover, as Ković thinks, a crucial topic in American history, namely, the genocide of indigenous people. According to Miloš Ković, Calvinism laid religious and moral foundations for the American „myth of being chosen“. He further stated that by bestowing on themselves the exclusive right to make moral judgements, the Americans „hurtle toward disaster on the international scene“.

In addition to the above, America breaks promises and, according to the host, Milomir Marić, does not honour any agreements. Marić also mentioned the former American President Clinton who, according to the host, was prepared to sacrifice thousands of Srebrenica civilians to justify the bombing of Serbia.

Cyrillic telecast on 10 December 2018 presented internal affairs of the USA in an extremely apocalyptic tone. According to Aleksandar Pavić, there is already "a silent civil war" going on in the utterly disoriented USA. Apocalyptic nuance of America is also comprised of its neoconservative turn reflected in, among other things, anti-Russian sentiment. For Pavić, this anti-Russian attitude of American

²⁰ In this episode of *Questionnaire*, which addressed the issue of Kosovo, in addition to Odalović, guests were Igor Simić and Miroslav Lazanski.

²¹ Apart from Zoran Anđelković, this edition of *Questionnaire* featured Marko Đurić, Miloš Jovanović and Čedomir Jovanović.

²² This edition of *Questionnaire* featured Nebojša Čović along with Vladimir Jovanović and Milovan Drecun.

neoconservative establishment automatically represents anti-Serb attitude. Pavić's observations carry weight by the fact that, as it was pointed out, he studied and lived in the USA and thus had the opportunity to fathom the nature of American economy and politics from their source.

Aleksandar Pavić also explained the reason for such strong anti-Russian sentiment among American neoconservatives. Since many of them are of East European Jewish origin, they have „atavistic fear of Russia and Orthodoxy “. From a psychological perspective, it is quite clear that the fear generates hatred and therefore, according to Pavić, neoconservatives „literally hate Russia “.

Unlike, for example, Srđa Trifković, Reljić argued that American policy towards Serbia/Serbs i.e. Kosovo was inconsistent. Reljić's conclusion deviated from the deep-rooted opinion that the US policy was consistent when it came to its extreme aversion to Serbia/Serbs. Accordingly, Reljić continued to argue that the West perpetuates Kosovo as a *provisorium*, as no state. Empires (namely the USA as a dominant present-time empire) encourage permanent conflicts. In such conflicts, America has its allies, „NATO infantry“, as named by the host of *Cyrillic*, Milomir Marić in the edition of 3 December 2018. Marić mentioned the names of individuals who were also part of that infantry such as Ante Gotovina, Naser Orić, and Ramush Haradinaj. This relates to the claims of Miloš Ković in *Cyrillic* of 7 January 2019 that NATO „encourages ethnic cleansing of the Serbs and their fencing in ghettos “.

As much as it used to be an absolute superpower, according to Reljić, America today is „neither such great power nor the only power “. According to Aleksandar Pavić, former global power asymmetry, where the USA played a key role, is now diluted. Such global power aspired, mainly in this part of Europe, to strip the states of their sovereignty. In spite of it all, Pavić claimed that only the Greeks and the Serbs managed to preserve their state's capacity. To that extent, a former President, Slobodan Milošević, was perceived by the participants in the show as a person who openly stood up against monocentric global order. For these reasons, Reljić perceived Milošević and, possibly Mladić, as persons who could well enjoy the status of historical figures.

Current American President, Donald Trump, was not given particular attention. In one of the rare remarks made about Trump's presidency, Vuk Drašković²³ found that he is an unpredictable statesman. At the same time, Milovan Drecun concluded that Serbia should use the Trump administration to return the Kosovo process to the discussion path. In Questionnaire of 25 December 2018²⁴,

²³ President of the Serbian Renewal Movement was a guest in *Questionnaire* on 20 November 2018, and his collocutors were Predrag Marković and Milorad Pupovac.

²⁴ In addition to an official of the Socialist Movement, this edition of *Questionnaire* featured Vojislav Šešelj, Milenko Jovanov and Zoran Lutovac. Incidentally, at one point, Lutovac left the show dissatisfied with its host and behaviour of particular participants.

Đorđe Komlenski believed that Trump was likely to play a more positive role regarding Kosovo.

Cyrillic aired on 7 January 2019 had one participant, a journalist Slobodan Lekić, whose vintage point diverged from such like-mindedness. His viewpoint not only diverged from that of other participants in the mentioned episode of *Cyrillic* but also from all the other guests of the analysed shows. Namely, Lekić looked back to the period after the World War 2 and pointed out that Yugoslavia had received a considerable financial aid from the USA. Referring to the present political and economic circumstances, Slobodan Lekić thought that joining NATO meant considerable economic advantages, notably for small countries.

The Eu

In the previous section, overall colonial and imperial aspirations were attributed to the USA. When it comes to the EU, things are somewhat different. Although it was considered that the EU also uses a colonial approach to Kosovo, it was not labelled as any type of an empire. According to Slobodan Reljić, who appeared in *Cyrillic* of 10 December 2018, the EU not only showed its colonial arrogance to Kosovo but also to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Whereas it does not hesitate to treat particular European non-member states in a colonial manner, according to Reljić, the EU experiences the crisis of democracy among its member states. Similarly, Miloš Ković pointed out in *Cyrillic* of 7 January 2019, that the EU has grown „an impersonal technocracy“. As a particular response, a “sovereignist virus” is rapidly spreading across Europe, Ković said, and in support of his statement he mentioned Brexit and Orban’s²⁵ Hungary. Similarly, in *Questionnaire* of 27 November 2018, Čović said that after the elections to the European Parliament, there would be more pro-Russian MEPs. Only partly along those lines, Milorad Pupovac concluded in *Questionnaire* of 20 November 2018, that in the past years, the EU had been politically disempowered. Moreover, according to the host of *Cyrillic*, Milomir Marić, the EU is perceived as ground where Putin and Trump vie for influence.

When it comes to the capacity of the EU to influence political representatives of Kosovo Albanians, as a rule, common attitude is that the Albanians just wait for the Americans to tell them what to do. In *Questionnaire* of 18 December 2018, Miloš Jovanović pointed out that Berlin, Brussels, London and Washington requested from Serbia to recognise Kosovo.

In the talk show *Yes Perhaps Not* of 6 December 2018²⁶, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Johannes Hahn, said that the EU advocates the creation of the common market. In the same instalment of *Yes Perhaps Not*, Dejan

²⁵ Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, who, incidentally, was dubbed authoritarian populist by a respectable political scientist, Jan-Werner Müller, (Müller, 2018).

²⁶ Guests of this edition of *Yes Perhaps Not* were Zoran Lutovac, Marko Đurić and Dejan Radenković.

Radenković stressed that the response of the EU to the tariffs so imposed²⁷ was mild, which was in contradiction to Hahn's statement.

The EU is often criticised through Serbian political elite. Thus, in *Cyrillic* of 7 January 2019, Miloš Ković attributed "euro-uniatic fanaticism" to the political elite in Serbia. We should dispel the illusion of Serbia's accession to the EU, Vojislav Šešelj remarked in *Questionnaire* of 25 December 2018, since that would bring "huge misery" according to Šešelj's doom and gloom.

When it comes to the past EU attitude to SFRY disintegration, the then President of SFRY Presidency, Borisav Jović, was of the opinion that the other countries succumbed to Germany's „strong support to Slovenia and Croatia to leave Yugoslavia “.

Questionnaire of 20 November 2018, which addressed the relations of Serbia with the countries in the region, contained criticism of the EU in the light of disintegration of former Yugoslavia. According to Predrag Marković, it does not matter whether that happened due to recklessness, stupidity or ill intentions, the EU allowed a country, that was a kind of its predecessor, to collapse. On the other hand, Vuk Drašković felt that the EU was too blind to see two determining sources of hatred such as „Ustashisation of Croatia “ and „network of security agencies in Serbia “. Furthermore, the EU failed the test since Drašković saw it as a substitute for disintegrated Yugoslavia, a kind of sobering up teacher of our ill-fated country and its surroundings. Finally, if the EU accepted the creation of the Albanian nation-state, according to Vladislav Jovanović who appeared in *Questionnaire* of 27 November 2018, the Balkan multi-ethnicity concept would be deconstructed. In *Questionnaire* of 25 December 2018, Đorđe Komlenski expressed his views that the EU had „absolutely detrimental effect on anything that concerned the Kosovo status“.

When it comes to the relations between the EU and Serbia/Kosovo, Čedomir Jovanović expressed his viewpoint circumspectly, stating in *Questionnaire* of 18 December 2018 that Ramush Haradinaj criticises the EU i.e. Federica Mogherini more fiercely than anyone else in Serbia.

Russia

As opposed to what he said about the USA and its attitude to Serbia/Serbs, in *Cyrillic* of 10 December 2018, Aleksandar Pavić perceived Russia as a state offering to Serbia/Serbs all kinds of assistance. Criticising the logic of the US globalist economy, Pavić felt that such logic was not so openly present in the Russian capital.

To a greater extent than Donald Trump in the USA, Vladimir Putin is almost the embodiment of the present-time Russia. The significance that the Serbian public attach to the Russian President was supported by the indirect remark of

²⁷ Draconian taxes on goods coming from Serbia imposed by Kosovo authorities.

Marko Đurić made in *Questionnaire* of 18 December 2018 that Aleksandar Vučić had met with Putin as much as fourteen times.

Supporting his statement with the historical experience, in *Cyrillic* of 7 January 2019 Miloš Ković pointed out that since 19th century, the Russians had always defended the Serbs. Miloš Ković was not the only one who expressed that opinion. Namely, as a rule, the attitude of Russia/Russians to Serbia/Serbs was placed in a comparative framework by contrasting it with the attitude of the USA /Americans to Serbia/Serbs. The exaggerations regarding such hostile US attitude to Serbia automatically made Russia even friendlier. Ković thought that it was certainly beyond doubt that, as opposed to the Americans, the Russian public perceived the Serbs as friends.

Ković drew the timeline of Russophobia in Europe, and then in the United States, starting from the first half of the 19th century. That was also reflected on the attitude of Europe/USA to the Serbs, who started to be seen as "little Russians" because they are the Slavs and Orthodox Christians just like the Russians. Ković further followed the line to the twentieth century when, according to him, Russiophobia was reshaped into anti-communism. However, Ković remarked that with the collapse of socialism, Russiophobia has not diminished. On the contrary, today, in the West, it has grown strong again.

Even when Russia is not so openly praised, it is frequently seen, together with China, as a potential protector of Serbian interests in Kosovo. In any case, it is indisputable that Serbia has, as Zoran Anđelkovic said, friendly relations with Russia and China. Here, one can already discern dual friendliness of the East – of the closer Eurasia (Russia) and of the Far East (China).

In *Cyrillic* of 10 December 2018, Slobodan Reljić expressed his opinion that Serbia is in no position to ask anyone for support and therefore it should move toward „Eurasian integrations “. In *Questionnaire* of 25 December 2018, Šešelj also took a homologous approach and placed his focus on the military aspect. Šešelj felt that it would be beneficial to join military alliance led by Russia and thus protect Serbia from NATO. More specifically, Šešelj suggested that Russia and China should be asked to become a part of KFOR. Finally, in the *Questionnaire* of 27 November 2018, Vladimir Jovanović concluded that the West had fears that Serbia might go over to the other, Russian side.

In his discussion about geocultural positioning of the Serbs, a priest of Serbian Orthodox Church, Džomić, used "either-or logic". Namely, the Serbs have always looked to either the East (Russia) or the West (present NATO). It could be seen that for the purposes of polemics, NATO is used as synecdoche for the West.

As opposed to deeply rooted opinions, in *Cyrillic* of 3 December 2018, Srđa Trifković argued that a strong comeback of Russia to the international scene could not be the subject of discussion because Russia had actually lost its positions in Ukraine and on the Balkans.

Darko Tanasković pointed out that the relations between Russia/Russians and Serbia/Serbs were seen as the Serbs acting like “little Russians”, as viewed from the West. As opposed to his opinion, Slobodan Lekić said that he had never heard anyone in NATO calling the Serbs „little Russians “. On the other hand, in *Questionnaire* of 13 November 2018, the host, Olivera Jovičević, said that particular American media perceived Serbia (and Russia as its ally) as someone who „sabre-rattles over Kosovo“. According to that statement, Russia will be the one to deliver military equipment and tanks to Serbia. This is added by Drecun’s statement in *Questionnaire* of 27 November 2018 that the line of confrontation between the USA and Russia goes over Serbia. Thus, geopolitical calculation, according to Drecun, is that Russian influence would be diminished by Serbia’s weakening.

As it was previously mentioned, Slobodan Lekić emphasised the financial aid received by Yugoslavia after the World War 2. As opposed to that, Lekić said that today, Russia does not provide such help as the USA used to. „I don’t see Putin eggs coming like Truman eggs used to come “, resorted Lekić to a well-known metaphor.

Closing Remarks

The subject of discussions were global structures relevant for the Balkan Peninsula and, above all, for Serbia/Kosovo - namely, the USA, the EU and Russia. If we wanted to be even more precise, we would single out Kosovo as a place name around which the analysed political talk shows were centred. Three global actors and their attitude to Serbia and Kosovo were observed solely through their geopolitical, military and strategic influence. Save for very few exceptions, economic, cultural and societal levels were largely brushed aside. The fact that global actors were perceived solely through the events that were taking place in Serbia resulted in (self-induced) provincialism of the media. Regardless of its evident ideological one-sidedness, *Cyrillic* partly managed to draw globally wider coordinates. However, the importance attached to the US, the EU and Russia was the same regardless of whether they were viewed globally or from the vantage point of the developments in Serbia. The position taken towards the mentioned global actors depended on the perception of their attitude to Serbia / Kosovo.

It is sufficient just to glance through the text to see the discursive disproportion between the three global actors. Researchers would not be second-guessing to say that it was to be expected that the United States would also prevail in the quantitative discourse analysis. The unquestionable global significance of the US was reflected in the explanatory and interpretative approaches taken by the participants of the analysed political talk shows.

The discursive series of analyses, mainly of *Cyrillic*, outlined the contours of the dichotomy of Serbia’s global friends and enemies. The role of the global antagonist (not only when it comes to Serbia / Kosovo) was assigned to the USA. On the other hand, not only was Russia recognized as a friend of Serbia, but also

as a counterbalancing global protagonist. The discursive focus of the mentioned dichotomy was placed on the US hostility to Serbia rather than on friendly relations with Russia. In view of this dimension, the EU may fit into the dichotomous pattern, given that the EU was treated, though to a somewhat milder extent than the United States, as a global player with not particularly friendly intentions to Serbia. Bearing in mind its general discursive strategy, it could be expected that *Cyrillic* would take the lead in such dichotomization. Finally, it could be noticed that in addition to Russia, China was often seen as a global friend of Serbia / Serbs.

In view of the above, it was clear that the analysed political TV talk shows lacked impartiality in their treatment of three global actors. It should be noted that the extent of bias expressed in *Cyrillic* was considerably higher than that of the analysed political shows telecast by RTS. At the same time, in its bias, *Cyrillic* was, quite understandably, harsher in its criticism than *Questionnaire* and *Yes Perhaps Not*.

For years now, the studies have shown that the Serbian citizens are evidently more favourably disposed towards Russia (and China) than towards the EU and, particularly, the USA²⁸. Accordingly, when it comes to the analysed global actors, the observed political TV talk shows only reflect a prevalent virtual imagology in the Serbian society. As much as such homology can be expected, ideally, political talk shows should attempt to express a certain reasonable doubt as to the deep-rooted opinions about global actors. Suffice it to say, such doubt left much to be desired.

Literature

- Douzinias, Costas. 2016. *Filozofija i otpor o krizi*. Novi Sad: Mediterran
- Krnjević, Hatidža. 1992. Sinegdoha, u Živković, Dragiša (ur.). *Rečnik književnih termina*. Beograd: Nolit
- Müller, Jan-Werner. 2018. *Homo Orbanicus*. <https://pescanik.net/homo-orbanicus/>
- Potter, Jonathan, Wetherell, Margaret. 1987. *Discourse and Social Psychology*. Sage Publications
- Todorov, Cvetan. 2014. *Strah od varvara*. Loznica: Karpos

²⁸ This can be illustrated by the example of fresh research findings of the study *West Balkans between the East and the West* published last year in November by the Washington-based National Democratic Institute.

Marina Mijatović

MONITORING OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT OF MONITORING SOFTWARE

INTRODUCTION²⁹

1. In society, the freedom of media shows the situation which is directly related to the freedom of expression. Currently, the actual state of affairs relating to the media freedom is quite adverse, which is supported by the fact that Serbia has dropped 14 places on the 2019 World Press Freedom Index³⁰ - the same as Hungary. In addition to the Reporters without Borders, Freedom House³¹ also found that Serbia has become partly free country³² in relation to political rights, civil liberties and separation of powers.³³
2. Umbrella regulations governing media were not changed in 2018, despite the fact that numerous gaps were identified as precursors to abuse. However, one could well argue that the biggest problem lies in the interpretation of legal rules and application of regulations, particularly in the cases where administrative bodies exceed their powers.
3. On the other hand, in 2018, the Regulatory Authority of Electronic Media (hereinafter: REM) adopted the documents that were contrary to the Law on Electronic Media. This speaks of the fact that the usual procedures for amending regulations were not followed. Despite arguments that particular by-laws were not in line with the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia and that consequently, particular legal rules laid out in the Law on Electronic Media contravened the Constitution, the administrative authority did not have a green light to act contrary to the law. Ever since the Law on Electronic Media was adopted, the REM has not pointed out to this issue nor has it initiated the procedure for the assessment of constitutionality.
4. The REM's practices and actions in the events when the laws are breached are less visible and available to the public. The citizens' complaints and the decisions of the REM have become utterly non-transparent. To that extent, it can be concluded that REM made a few steps backwards in its decision-making; instead of improving the manner in which it explains its decisions, the REM ruled out any possibility of legal analysis. With such conduct, the

²⁹ All terms referenced in the text include both masculine and feminine gender

³⁰ https://rsf.org/en/ranking_table

³¹ <https://freedomhouse.org>

³² <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat>

³³ <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/serbia>

REM precluded the citizens from participating in the assessment of media activities and evaluation of the level of press freedom.

5. The REM is legally mandated to analyse the activities of media service providers and collect the data during the year. In accordance with its mandate, the REM is obliged to make available all collected data to the interested citizens, for further processing. Such open approach to the data on the activities of media service providers collected by the REM would enhance participation of associations dealing with monitoring of the media.
6. Every year, the REM conducts public procurement procedure for maintenance and upgrade of monitoring software used as a tool for data storing and processing. Monitoring data gathered by the REM are not available and cannot be obtained even by filing a request for access to information of public importance (hereinafter: request). The arguments provided for the denial of request are that the intellectual property rights of the software company must be protected. However, the content of request clearly shows that it relates only to the data and not to the part which contains a software code.
7. With the aim to instigate changes in all mechanisms for the protection of rights of access to the information of public importance, the Bureau for Social Research (hereinafter: BIRODI) has lodged a complaint to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection.³⁴

METHODOLOGY

8. The analysis of REM's activities is aimed at monitoring the trend of media freedom in Serbia, and was based on the 2017 Report. In the first step, considered were umbrella regulations adopted in the previous period. Subsequently, analysed were the documents and decisions which fall within the REM's competence.
9. In relation to the transparency of REM's activities, the research was focused on the website searches and comparison of quality and quantity of published information in the period between 2017 and 2018.
10. Another, highly important data collection mechanism, was the request for access to information of public importance, which was used to obtain the information that was not published on the REM's website.
11. The actions of the REM in relation to public procurements for maintenance and upgrade of monitoring software were analysed through the information available on the Public Procurement Portal. Separately analysed sections are: public procurement plans, tender documents, implementation of public procurement procedures, and opinions of the Public Procurement

³⁴ <https://www.poverenik.rs>

Administration in connection with the realisation of the negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for the submission of bids.

REGULATIONS

Amendments to regulations

12. Umbrella regulations governing media have not been subject to amendments since 2017. However, in 2019, two by-laws ceased to be effective. The title of the first such document was ***List of Television Programmes Anticipated for Mandatory Transmission as a Measure of Protecting Media Pluralism***³⁵ (hereinafter: List). The List was defined by the REM Council (hereinafter: Council) on 10 October 2017. The Council defined the List pursuant to Article 106 of the Law on Electronic Media³⁶ (hereinafter: LEM) which stipulates the obligation to transmit in order to protect media pluralism by obliging the REM to periodically, at least once every three years, establish a list of radio or television programmes to be transmitted by operators. The criterion was that electronic communications network for distribution and broadcast of media content must be used by a significant number of end users as the sole or primary method for receiving media content. The List laid out:
 - i. Radio Broadcasting Company B92 ad, Beograd (Zemun) - O2.TV
 - ii. Company for marketing, publishing, radio and television Happy TV doo, Beograd - Nacionalna Happy TV
 - iii. Company for information and marketing Pink International Company Limited Liability Company, Beograd - TV PINK
 - iv. Prva televizija doo, Beograd - PRVA
13. At the Council meeting held on 22 January 2019, the List was unanimously revoked³⁷ and the explanation was published in the minutes that can be found on the REM's website³⁸. The main arguments used for revocation of the List were achievement of financial equity and equality in the market. Although the obligation of cable operators was not deleted from the Law, the Council removed the List. It is worth noting that in relation to the operator's failure to comply with specific commitments regarding the protection of media pluralism, Article 109 of the LEM provides for a fine of 100,000 to 1,000,000 RSD. In addition, the offender may be fined in the range of 10,000 to 200,000 RSD. The REM made a decision which was not

³⁵ <http://rem.rs/uploads/files/Odluke/Liste%20programa.pdf>

³⁶ Official Gazette of RS, no. 83/2014 and 6/2016

³⁷ <http://rem.rs/uploads/files/Zapisnici/ZAPISNIK%20sa%20326.%20vanredne%20sednice%2022.01.2019.pdf> – page

³⁸ <http://www.rem.rs/sr/arhiva/vesti/2019/01/interpretativno-saopstenje-povodom-stavljanja-van-snage-liste-kanala-za-koje-je-predvidjen-obavezan-prenos>

in accordance with legal provisions and thus, the removal of the List without prior amendment to the LEM created legal nonsense.

14. If we take into account the explanation of the REM that Article 106 of the LEM is not in line with Article 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia³⁹ (hereinafter: Constitution), the question may be raised as to why the procedure for assessing the Law constitutionality has not been initiated. Namely, Article 84 of the Constitution regulates equal legal status i.e. participation under equal market conditions for everyone. In addition to the foregoing, this Article prohibits the acts which "contrary to the law, restrict free competition by creating or abusing monopolistic or dominant status". In this particular case, there is no Decision of the Constitutional Court that the legal rule laid out in the LEM is contrary to the Constitution, leaving aside the meaning and consequences produced by the obligation to adopt the List. On the other hand, if the REM had thought that the LEM contained the provisions which were in breach of the Constitution, it should have taken all reasonable measures to eliminate those irregularities instead of acting beyond its mandate of an administrative body and taking the role of the Constitutional Court. These arguments are not produced as an answer to the question whether the obligation of the operator should have been redefined but as the proper manner in which regulations and procedures for assessing the constitutionality of legal acts should have been observed.
15. On 27 February 2019, the Council abrogated another document, *Rulebook on the Obligations of Media Service Providers during Election Campaigns*⁴⁰. This Rulebook was rendered null and void based on Article 25 and 33 of the LEM, and by the *Rulebook on Termination of the Rulebook on the Obligations of Media Service Providers during Election Campaigns*.⁴¹ The decision was adopted at the 204th ordinary meeting of the Council⁴² where the motion to abrogate this Rulebook was unanimously adopted. In addition, it was concluded that rendering the Rulebook ineffective happened after a discussion. However, not one sentence explaining such decision could be found in the minutes.

Picture number 1 – Excerpt from the minutes of the 204th ordinary meeting of the Council


³⁹ Official Gazette of RS, number 98/2006

⁴⁰ Official Gazette of RS, number 55/2015 and 90/2017

⁴¹ Official Gazette of RS, number 15/2019

⁴²

<http://rem.rs/uploads/files/Zapisnici/ZAPISNIK%20204.%20redovna%20sednica%20Saveta%20RRA%20odr%C5%BEana%2027.02.2019.%20godine.pdf>



PRACTICE

16. Main recommendations concerning the control of the observance of regulations governing the activities of the media in pre-election campaigns are defined in the 2017 Report. However, after analysing the information provided on the REM's website, it was clear that the practice has not changed at all. The presidential election in April 2017 was followed by the local election for the City Assembly of Belgrade held in March 2018.
17. In view of the previous report and its conclusions and recommendations, it was expected that the REM's practices would improve, namely, that the decisions would become more transparent and contain more detailed explanations. In that period, the website of REM contained the list of citizens' complaints⁴³ pointing out the breach of regulations governing media activities during pre-election campaigns. However, instead of taking steps toward improving its practice, in 2018, the REM did quite the opposite and prevented the citizens from accessing the information about complaints and decisions.
18. Press releases on the monitoring of pre-election video clips and the minutes of the Council meetings were the only thing published on the REM's website:

⁴³ <http://www.rem.rs/sr/predsednicki-izbori-2017/izbori-2017-prijave-i-postupanja-saveta>

- i. At the 294th extraordinary meeting of the Council held on 17 February 2018⁴⁴ the complaint to the JMU RTS was discussed in relation to the disputable content of the political advertising message „The Mayor“. The REM ordered immediate broadcast suspension of the pre-election advertising message „The Mayor“ which contained recorded images of candidates Dragan Đilas and Aleksandar Šapić and was produced by the electoral list „Aleksandar Vučić –Because We Love Belgrade“. On the same day, the REM published the press release⁴⁵ that contained more details than the decision.

www.rem.rs/sr/arhiva/vesti/2018/02/saopstenje-za-medije-povodom-zah-teva-jmu-rt-s-za-monitoringom-predizbornog-spota-grad

80

Саопштење за медије поводом захтева ЈМУ РТС за мониторингом предизборног спота „Градоначелник“ изборне листе „Александар Вучић – Зато што волим Београд“

17. фебруар 2018. 20:10:05

Саопштење за медије

На данашњој 294. ванредној седници, а на основу јучерашњег захтева ЈМУ Радио Телевизија Србије за мониторингом предизборног спота „Градоначелник“ изборне листе „Александар Вучић – Зато што волим Београд“, Савет Регулаторног тела за електронске медије је на основу Извештаја Службе за надзор и анализу, донео Одлуку да подносиоцу пријаве ЈМУ РТС и свим другим пружаоцима медијских услуга наложи да, у смислу чл. 15. ст. 1. Закона о оглашавању, хитно обустави емитовање ове предизборне огласне поруке која садржи записе ликова кандидата других изборних листа, без претходно прибављене њихове сагласности. У случају непоштовања одлуке Савета РЕМ-а, Регулатор ће покренути поступке изрицања мера предвиђених Законом о електронским медијима.

Образложење

У програму пружаоца медијских услуга РТС 1, 17. фебруара 2018. године, (емисија Жикина шареница 9:08 -11:00, предизборни блок огласних порука 9:42:58 – 9:44:54, политичка огласна порука 9:43:52 - 9:44:51) уочена је политичка огласна порука (предизборни спот) „Градоначелник“ у трајању од 59 секунди изборне листе „Александар Вучић – Зато што волим Београд“.

У наведеном споту се у три кадра (9:43:59-9:44:01 и два везана кадра 9:44:40-9:44:45) појављује слика Драгана Ђиласа и Александра Шапића, носилаца других изборних листа на локалним изборима за град Београд.

Сходно члану 15. став 1. Закона о оглашавању, огласна порука која садржи лично добро на основу кога се може утврдити или препознати идентитет лица, може се објавити у програму пружаоца медијске услуге једино уз претходни пристанак лица на које се лично добро односи. У конкретном случају, предметна огласна порука садржи фотографски запис ликова кандидата других изборних листа Драгана Ђиласа и Александра Шапића, те се иста може објавити једино уз њихов претходни пристанак.

Закључак: Објављивањем овакве огласне поруке у свом програму без прибављања претходног пристанка лица на које се лично добро односи, пружалац медијске услуге повређује одредбу члана 15. став 1. Закона о оглашавању, што је основ за хитно обустављање емитовања предизборне поруке, односно, у супротном, за покретање поступка изрицања мера предвиђених Законом о електронским медијима.


Регулаторно тело за електронске медије

Picture number 2 – Comparative view of the minutes of the 294th extraordinary meeting of the Council and press release of 17 February 2018

44

http://rem.rs/uploads/files/Zapisnici/ZAPISNIK%20sa%20294.%20vanredne%20sednice%2017.02.2018_1.pdf

⁴⁵ <http://www.rem.rs/sr/arhiva/vesti/2018/02/saopstenje-za-medije-povodom-zah-teva-jmu-rt-s-za-monitoringom-predizbornog-spota-gradonacelnik-izborne-liste-aleksandar-vucic-zato-sto-volim-beograd>



- ii. At the 296th extraordinary meeting of the Council held on 23rd February 2018⁴⁶ the complaint to the JMU RTS was discussed in relation to the political advertising message „Ѓilas 1 and 1“ of the electoral list „Dragan Ѓilas – Belgrade Decides, People Win“. The REM established that there were no elements that may be in contravention to the Law on Advertising, nor were there breaches of other laws on media and elements of discrimination against other electoral lists. On the same day, the REM published the press release⁴⁷ that contained more details than the decision.

19. When the content of these two decisions is analysed, it can be clearly seen that in relation to the first clip (item i.), the decision was adopted to immediately suspend the broadcast, whereas in relation to the other clip

⁴⁶

http://rem.rs/uploads/files/Zapisnici/ZAPISNIK%20sa%20296.%20vanredne%20sednice%2023.02.2018_1.pdf

⁴⁷ <http://www.rem.rs/sr/arhiva/vesti/2018/02/saopstenje-za-medije-povodom-zahteva-jmu-rti-za-monitoringom-predizbornog-spota-djilas-jedan-i-jedan-izborne-liste-dragan-djilas-beograd-odlucuje-ljudi-pobedjuju>

(item ii.), JMU RTS asked the REM for the opinion before its broadcast. Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that in the same situations, RTS did not act in the same manner.

20. Picture number 3 – Example of different manner in which RTS responded to the same situation during 2018 pre-election campaign

www.rem.rs/sr/arhiva/vesti/2018/02/saopstenje-za-medije-povodom-zahteva-jmu-rtс-za-monitoringom-predizbornog-spota-gra

80

Саопштење за медије поводом захтева ЈМУ РТС за мониторингом предизборног спота „Градоначелник“ изборне листе „Александар Вучић – Зато што волим Београд“

17. фебруар 2018. 20:10:05

Саопштење за медије

На данашњој 294. ванредној седници, а на основу јучерашњег захтева ЈМУ Радио Телевизија Србије за мониторингом предизборног спота „Градоначелник“ изборне листе „Александар Вучић – Зато што волим Београд“, Савет Регулаторног тела за електронске медије је на основу Извештаја Службе за надзор и анализу, донео Одлуку да подносиоцу пријаве ЈМУ РТС и свим другим пружаоцима медијских услуга наложи да, у смислу чл. 15. ст. 1. Закона о оглашавању, хитно обуставе емитовање ове предизборне огласне поруке која садржи записе ликова кандидата других изборних листа, без претходно прибављене њихове сагласности. У случају непоштовања одлуке Савета РЕМ-а, Регулатор ће покренути поступке изрицања мера предвиђених Законом о електронским медијима.

Образложење

У програму пружаоца медијских услуга РТС 1, 17. фебруара 2018. године, (емисија Жикина шареница 9:08 -11:00, предизборни блок огласних порука 9:42:58 – 9:44:54, политичка огласна порука 9:43:52 - 9:44:51) уочена је политичка огласна порука (предизборни спот) „Градоначелник“ у трајању од 59 секунди изборне листе „Александар Вучић – Зато што волим Београд“. У наведеном споту се у три кадра (9:43:59-9:44:01 и два везана кадра 9:44:40-9:44:45) појављује слика Драгана Ђиласа и Александра Шапића, носилаца других изборних листа на локалним изборима за град Београд.

Сходно члану 15. став 1. Закона о оглашавању, огласна порука која садржи лично добро на основу кога се може утврдити или препознати идентитет лица, може се објавити у програму пружаоца медијске услуге једино уз претходни пристанак лица на које се лично добро односи. У конкретном случају, предметна огласна порука садржи фотографији запис ликова кандидата других изборних листа Драгана Ђиласа и Александра Шапића, те се иста може објавити једино уз њихов претходни пристанак.

Закључак: Објављивањем овакве огласне поруке у свом програму без прибављања претходног пристанка лица на које се лично добро односи, пружалац медијске услуге повређује одредбу члана 15. став 1. Закона о оглашавању, што је основ за хитно обустављање емитовања предизборне поруке, односно, у супротном, за покретање поступка изрицања мера предвиђених Законом о електронским медијима.

Регулаторно тело за електронске медије

Саопштење за медије поводом захтева ЈМУ РТС за мониторингом предизборног спота „Ћилас један и један“ изборне листе „Драган Ћилас – Београд одлучује – Људи побеђују“

23. фебруар 2018. 19:10:21

Саопштење за медије

На данашњој 296. ванредној седници, а на основу данашњег захтева ЈМУ Радио Телевизија Србије за мониторингом предизборног спота „Ћилас један и један“ изборне листе „Драган Ћилас – Београд одлучује – Људи побеђују“, Савет Регулаторног тела за електронске медије је на основу Извештаја Службе за надзор и анализу, донео Одлуку да подносиоцу пријаве ЈМУ РТС и свим другим пружаоцима медијских услуга одобри емитовање ове предизборне политичке поруке, с обзиром да нема елемената кршења Закона о оглашавању, нити било ког закона из сета закона о медијима.

Образложење

На основу увида у садржај политичке огласне поруке (предизборног спота) „Ћилас 1 и 1“ изборне листе „Драган Ћилас – Београд одлучује, људи побеђују“, стручна служба Регулаторне агенције за електронске медије (РЕМ) мишљења је да нема елемената који би били у супротности са Законом о оглашавању нити има повреде других закона о медијима, као ни елемената дискриминације других изборних листа.

ЈМУ РТС доставио је на давање мишљења политичку огласну поруку „Ћилас 1 и 1“ изборне листе „Драган Ћилас – Београд одлучује, људи побеђују“ за коју је планиран почетак емитовања на програму РТС, почев од 25.02.2018. године.

ОПИС:

„Наравно, не пада вам ни на памет да гласате за број један.

А да пробате да гласате овако:

Сад већ може зар не. Једноставно је један и један - једанаест. Ћилас. Београд одлучује, људи побеђују“.

Предизборни спот траје 15 секунди.

Регулаторно тело за електронске медије

21. The report of the Service for Supervision and Analysis *Pre-Election Advertising Messages in the Election Campaign for the City Assembly of Belgrade 12-02-2018-01-03-2018* was adopted at the 301st extraordinary meeting of the Council held on 21 March 2018⁴⁸. In the decision it was stated that the report would be published on the website of the REM and submitted to the Anti-Corruption Agency.
22. The REM's website contains the report⁴⁹ with the information of the programme structure of pre-election advertising messages for the period from 12 February to 1 March 2018, in relation to five media service providers (RTV PINK, Radio Television of Serbia 1, TV Prva, Hepi TV and O2 TV). The data show that pre-election advertising messages aired by RTV PINK had the highest length - 3:13:41 or 33.23%. The total length of pre-election advertising messages aired by all mentioned media service providers was 9:42:48.
23. There were seven electoral lists in the Belgrade City Assembly election. The report contains only the number of pre-election advertising messages by

48


http://rem.rs/uploads/files/Zapisnici/ZAPISNIK%20sa%20301.%20vanredne%20sednice%2021.03.2018_1.pdf

49 <http://rem.rs/uploads/files/Zapisnici/Politi%C4%8Dko%20ogla%C5%A1avanje%202018.pdf>

electoral lists, but not their total time. Due to such omission, the report is incomplete and does not provide the realistic picture of the extent to which electoral lists were presented during the campaign. The published data may help to calculate the percent of broadcasts but not the total duration of all advertising messages per one electoral list.

24. Although the minutes of the 301st extraordinary meeting show that the report of the Service for Supervision and Analysis was considered, it can be observed that the report does not contain the analysis with expert evaluation, conclusions and proposals for elimination of deficiencies. The report provides the breakdown of only two pieces of information: duration of pre-election advertising messages by media service providers and number of pre-election advertising messages by electoral lists.

Picture number 4 – Representation of pre-election advertising messages by electoral lists, in percents



25. Due to non-transparent publishing of all information relevant for the analysis, BIRODI submitted the request for access to information of public importance asking to receive the information from the REM's database for the purpose of further processing and analysis.

Procedure For Public Procurement Of Monitoring Software

26. Our analysis included the conduct of the procedure for 2017 public procurement of software and the opinion of the Public Procurement Administration. The transparency of REM's activities relating to observing the rules of the Public Procurement Law⁵⁰ and specific characteristics of the 2018 and 2019 procurement of the service for "maintenance and upgrade of monitoring software" were further monitored.
27. The biggest problem in the procurement of software maintenance service is the type of public procurement. In this particular case, the REM chose the negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for submission of bids.⁵¹ This type of procedure enables the REM to directly negotiate the elements of public procurement contract with one or more bidders.
28. Due to the possibility of abuse, namely, of the evasion of competitive tendering, the REM was obliged to ask the Public Procurement Administration⁵² (hereinafter: Administration) for the opinion.
29. On 20 November 2017, the REM filed the request to the Administration asking for the opinion on the conduct of negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for the submission of bids. The Administration issued a positive opinion and approved this type of procedure.⁵³ The grounds for positive opinion were found in the statement of the REM that the company "Informatika" a.d. is the only owner of the "source code of the software for regular monitoring and software for political monitoring, has not transferred such right to third parties, and therefore is the only one able to access, maintain and upgrade the subject software".
30. However, in its opinion, the Administration expressed reservations about the abuse by REM, explaining that the decision was based "on the evaluation of fulfilment of formal and legal conditions for the implementation of negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for submission of bids". On the other hand, the Administration did not address the issue of procedure effectiveness and left it up to the REM to evaluate whether the process was in accordance with the principles of efficiency and cost-effectiveness⁵⁴.

⁵⁰ Official Gazette of RS, numbers [124/2012](#), [14/2015](#) and [68/2015](#)

⁵¹ The same, Article 21

⁵² <http://www.ujn.gov.rs/>

⁵³ <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/MisljenjeUJNPrikaz.aspx?idd=1701037>

⁵⁴ Public Procurement Law, Article 9: „Contracting authority shall ensure that goods, services or works procured in public procurement are of appropriate quality relevant to the purpose, intended use and value of public procurement.

Contracting authority shall ensure that public procurement procedure is conducted and awarding of contracts is made within time limits and as prescribed by this Law, with minimum costs spent in conducting public procurement.“

31. Promptly upon obtaining positive opinion, on 29 December 2017, the REM published the notice on initiation of the procedure and tender documents on the Public Procurement Portal (hereinafter: Portal).⁵⁵ However, on 16 January 2018, the REM decided to suspend the procedure⁵⁶ because the company "Informatika" a.d. did not submit its bid until 8 January 2018. The value of public procurement was 794,632.00 Dinars excluding VAT.
32. On 1 February 2018, the REM addressed the same question to the Administration, and asked for the opinion regarding the same bidder. On 14 February 2018, the Administration issued identical opinion⁵⁷ and approved the negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for submission of bids.
33. Pursuant to the opinion of the Administration, on 21 February 2018 the REM published the notice of the procedure and tender documents.⁵⁸ The decision on contract award⁵⁹ was published on 7 March 2018, stating that the contract was awarded to the company „Informatika“a.d. The bidder submitted the bid for its services the value of which was 1,860,000.00 Dinars excluding VAT, whereas the estimated value of public procurement was 1,970,833.00 Dinars excluding VAT.
34. When taken into account that the estimated value of public procurement conducted in January 2018 amounted to 794,632.00 Dinars excluding VAT, and that the estimated value of public procurement of February 2018 amounted to 1,970,833.00 Dinars excluding VAT, it becomes clear that the REM did not investigate the market. After reading the notice of initiation of the negotiated procedure it can be observed that the subject of public procurement of February 2018 was extended compared to the public procurement of December 2017, which means that the REM did not appropriately plan its procurement according to its needs.
35. In addition, it is worth noting that the estimated value of public procurement was 794,632.00 Dinars excl. VAT, whereas the second public procurement was worth 1,970,833.00 Dinars excl. VAT. Due to considerably different values of public procurements a question may be raised why "Informatika" a.d. did not submit the bid for public procurement of January 2018, while it did participate as a bidder in February 2018. The only thing that can be inferred is that the reason lies in the estimated value of public procurement.

⁵⁵ <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/Dokumenti/JavnaNabavka.aspx?idd=1730025>

⁵⁶ Decision on the suspension of procedure number 05-2510/17-16 of 15 January 2018.

⁵⁷ <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/MisljenjeUJNPrikaz.aspx?idd=1778229>

⁵⁸ <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/Dokumenti/JavnaNabavka.aspx?idd=1782740>

⁵⁹ Decision on contract award number 05-299/18-15 of 6 March 2018.

Picture number 5 – Excerpt from the notice of initiation of negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for submission of bids

Република Србија
РЕГУЛАТОРНО ТЕЛО
ЗА ЕЛЕКТРОНСКЕ МЕДИЈЕ

Број: 05-2510/17-12
Датум: 27.12.2017. године
Београд

**ОБАВЕШТЕЊЕ О ПОКРЕТАЊУ ПРЕГОВАРАЧКОГ ПОСТУПКА
БЕЗ ОБЈАВЉИВАЊА ПОЗИВА ЗА ПОДНОШЕЊЕ ПОНУДА**

Назив наручиоца: — Регулаторно тело за електронске медије
Адреса наручиоца: Трг Николе Пашића број 5, 11000 Београд
Интернет адреса Наручиоца: www.rem.rs;
Врста Наручиоца: Остало.
Врста поступка јавне набавке: јавне набавке мале вредности
Врста предмета: Услуге
Предмет јавне набавке:

ОРН - 72267000 - Услуге одржавања и поправке софтвера

Основ за примену преговарачког поступка и подаци који оправдавају његову примену:

Правни основ за примену:

Република Србија
РЕГУЛАТОРНО ТЕЛО
ЗА ЕЛЕКТРОНСКЕ МЕДИЈЕ

Број: 05-299/18-11
Датум: 21.02.2018. године
Београд

**ОБАВЕШТЕЊЕ О ПОКРЕТАЊУ ПРЕГОВАРАЧКОГ ПОСТУПКА
БЕЗ ОБЈАВЉИВАЊА ПОЗИВА ЗА ПОДНОШЕЊЕ ПОНУДА**

Назив наручиоца: — Регулаторно тело за електронске медије
Адреса наручиоца: Трг Николе Пашића број 5, 11000 Београд
Интернет адреса Наручиоца: www.rem.rs;
Врста Наручиоца: Остало.
Врста поступка јавне набавке: јавне набавке мале вредности
Врста предмета: Услуге
Предмет јавне набавке: Услуге одржавања и лопале софтера за мониторинг

72267000 - Услуге одржавања и поправке софтвера
72265000 - Услуге конфигурације софтвера
72261000 - Услуге софтерске подршке

36. When it comes to the public procurement conducted in 2019, the procedure was completely the same. Namely, on 1 February 2019, the REM asked the Administration to provide its opinion so that it can conduct the negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for submission of bids and on 7

February 2019, the Administration issued a positive opinion.⁶⁰ However, the Portal does not contain the information on initiation of negotiated procedure for the procurement of software maintenance and upgrade service.

Picture number 6 – Excerpt from the Public Procurement Portal on activities carried out by the REM in connection with maintenance and upgrade of monitoring software

portal.ujn.gov.rs/RezultatiPretrage.aspx?tab=1&pocetna=1&tp=F1KmN+JuNI=&nar=SSJthko2TfGyu+mm4Xfoq/Hy4IU/89BfizN/+WLx...

портал јавних набавки

претрага спискови извештаји комисија јавни уговори

контактирајте администратора
преузимање документа

Корисничко име: _____
Лозинка: _____
регистрација се пријавите се

Назив	нaruчилац	последња активност
Услуге мобилне телефоније	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	18.04.2019 14:26
Услуге чишћења пословних просторија	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	08.04.2019 12:48
Услуге осигурања	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	04.04.2019 15:05
Услуге набавке авио карата и хотелског смештаја у ...	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	01.03.2019 14:28
Набавка горива	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	14.02.2019 14:26
Резервни делови за рачунарску опрему и рачунарски ...	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	14.08.2018 12:32
Услуге набавке авио карата и хотелског смештаја у ...	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	20.06.2018 14:57
Услуге одржавања и дораде софтвера за мониторинг	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	05.04.2018 10:57
Услуга чишћења пословних просторија	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	05.04.2018 10:31
Услуге осигурања	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	30.03.2018 12:24
Гориво	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	13.03.2018 14:09
Услуге одржавања софтвера за мониторинг	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	23.01.2018 15:00
Резервни делови за рачунарску опрему и рачунарски ...	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	02.11.2017 13:50
Услуге набавке авио карата и хотелског смештаја	Регулаторно тело за електронске медије	13.06.2017 07:58

Остале напомене:	интерни број поступка: 1.2.1.								
1.2.2	Услуге осигурања	1,190,476	1,190,476	1,250,000	55210	поступак јавне набавке мале вредности	2	3	2
	По годинама:						2019	2019	2020
	2019-1,190,476								
Напомена:	Набавка се спроводи у циљу осигурања возила, лица и обезбеђења здравственог путног осигурања								
Разлог и оправданост набавке:	Процењена вредност је утврђена на основу утрошана средства у претходној години и пројекције трошкова у наредној години								
Начин утврђивања процене вредности:	интерни број поступка: 1.2.3.								
Остале напомене:	интерни број поступка: 1.2.3.								
1.2.3	Услуге одржавања и дораде софтвера за мониторинг	3,750,000	3,750,000	4,500,000	532101	поступак јавне набавке мале вредности	1	2	1
	По годинама:						2019	2019	2020
	2019-3,750,000								
Напомена:	Набавка се спроводи ради обављања редовних активности наручиоце уређених Законом о електронским медијима								
Разлог и оправданост набавке:	Процењена вредност је утврђена на основу месечних обавеза								
Начин утврђивања процене вредности:	интерни број поступка: 1.2.3.								
Остале напомене:	интерни број поступка: 1.2.3.								
1.2.4	Услуге чишћења пословних просторија	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,200,000	53210	поступак јавне набавке мале вредности	1	2	1
	По годинама:						2019	2019	2020
	2019-1,000,000								
Напомена:	Набавка се спроводи у циљу обезбеђивања одржавања хигијене у пословним просторијама								
Разлог и оправданост набавке:	Процењена вредност је утврђена на основу трошкова чишћења пословних просторија у претходној години и пројекције трошкова у наредној години								
Начин утврђивања процене вредности:	интерни број поступка: 1.2.4.								
Остале напомене:	интерни број поступка: 1.2.4.								

Датум штампе: 14.01.2019

Страна 2 од 15

⁶⁰ <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/MisljenjeUJNPrikaz.aspx?idd=2212347>

37. In the section of the Portal which contains the public procurement plans, the REM published that it would conduct the public procurement for software maintenance and upgrade in February 2019 and that the estimated value was 3,750,000.00 Dinars excluding VAT.

Picture number 7 – Excerpt from the public procurement plan of the REM for maintenance and upgrade of monitoring software

38. The data obtained from the documents published on the Portal and from the annual public procurement plans show that the estimated value of public procurement for software maintenance and upgrade has doubled each year:
- i. December 2017⁶¹ – 794,632.00 Dinars excluding VAT
 - ii. February 2018⁶² – 1,970,833.00 Dinars excluding VAT
 - iii. According to the 2019 public procurement plan⁶³ - 3,750,000.00 Dinars excluding VAT

Transparency

39. BIRODI submitted to the REM a request for access to information of public importance asking for the information whether REM performed any monitoring for the media service providers in the period from 1 January to 31 December 2018 (Public Media Institution „Radio-televizija Srbije“ (RTS); Company for Marketing and Information INTERNACIONAL COMPANY limited liability company, Belgrade - TV Pink; Radio Broadcasting Company B92 ad, Beograd (Zemun) – O2.TV; PRVA TELEVIZIJA doo, Beograd – Prva; Company for Marketing, Publishing, Radio and Television HAPPY TV doo, Beograd - Nacionalna Happy TV; N1 television). Hoping that it would receive an affirmative answer, BIRODI also asked for which data the monitoring was carried out. In addition, it also requested the information from REM's database, but in a machine-readable format suitable for further processing and analysis. The last question in the request related to obtaining the REM's reports which are based on the data from its own database.
40. In its reply, the REM completely ignored the question about sending the data from its database and for analyses and reports referred BIRODI to various websites. However, BIRODI found that such answer was incomplete. It demonstrated that the REM did not make the collected data available to the interested researchers.
41. After consulting the report on the manner in which Public Media Service Radio-televizija Srbije met its legally prescribed programme obligations in

⁶¹ <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/Planovi/PlanJavneNabavke.aspx?idd=110133>

⁶² <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/Planovi/PlanJavneNabavke.aspx?idd=118705>

⁶³ <http://portal.ujn.gov.rs/Planovi/PlanJavneNabavke.aspx?idd=139520>

the period 1 January to 31 December 2018⁶⁴, it became clear that there were gaps which needed to be filled with more in-depth analyses and more comprehensive reports. The example of the aforementioned is programme statistics which contains the list of 11 genres, including „current affairs programme“. In 2018, the total broadcast time of the first channel of Radio-televizija Srbije (RTS1) was 363:00:23:40, whereas the duration of current affairs programme was 122:11:16:44 (33.74% share).

42. However, further quantitative and qualitative analysis based on the REM's report was not possible. To obtain the proper insight into all genres (types of content) it would be necessary for the REM to open up all data and make them available and processable. Mere figures, published without explanations, cannot be considered an analysis and reporting that can be used to improve the work of media service providers.
43. When terms of transparency, the REM's activities in 2018 were graded lower relative to 2017 because the REM locked the data on its activities and did not provide citizens with the possibility to actively participate in the evaluation of media. The REM fully excluded citizens and citizens' associations from doing the research work and giving their suggestions toward improving the activities of the media.
44. In order to ensure the transparency of REM's activities, BIRODI filed a complaint to the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection stating that the REM failed to provide BIRODI with requested information. Namely, the REM did not submit to BIRODI the data from its monitoring database but only referred it to the published reports.

⁶⁴ <http://rem.rs/uploads/files/RDUS-i-RDUV/2018/RTS%20-%20godisnj%20izve%C5%A1taj%202018.pdf>

CONCLUSION

45. Quantitative and qualitative assessment of REM's transparency is graded very low. In relation to quantitative transparency, it can be concluded that REM denied citizens the information that was available before 2018. When it comes to quality of the published information, it was established that its content was meagre, namely, it met only one part of formal parameters (adopted decisions, but with no explanation).
46. Actions that the REM took in adopting the decisions and amending the documents that were within its competence were not in accordance with legal rules regulating this procedure. We would particularly like to point out that the REM failed to use the mechanisms for the assessment of constitutionality of particular legal rules.
47. Citizens have no possibility to publicly communicate with the REM which does not publish their complaints and decisions upon such complaints.
48. The data collected by the REM for the purpose of monitoring media service providers are not available in the format suitable for further processing and analysis.
49. Public procurement of monitoring software conducted through the negotiated procedure without publishing the invitation for the submission of bids must not be used as an argument for excluding the transparency and locking the data. The public is not interested in the software code but only in the data that the REM is obliged to collect.

RECOMMENDATIONS

50. Initiate actions toward improving the transparency of REM's activities.
51. Request from the REM to explain some of its decisions.
52. More active use of the mechanism for filing requests for access to information of public importance for the purpose of collecting data on REM's activities, and publishing REM's responses.
53. Initiate the protection mechanism in the event that no answer is obtained in relation to the request for access to information of public importance which meets qualitative and quantitative criteria.
54. Start initiatives with the aim to encourage citizens to address REM by filing the requests for access to information of public importance and by filing complaints.
55. More thorough control of the public procurement procedure for maintenance and upgrade of monitoring software.